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I. INTRODUCTION 
T his paper's purpose is to survey, and critically examine in the light of events of modern war, legal restraints which bear on environmental damage in 
international armed conflict. l More specifically, the paper addresses the question 
of whether, and if so how, environmental damage can be prevented or reduced 
during international armed conflicts and military occupations. Sections II to V of 
the paper take a general look (not especially related to the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict) 
at how this and related issues had been addressed before 1990. Sections VI to XI 
are principally about the events of the Gulf Conflict, including the 1991 Coalition 
war to liberate Kuwait, the Iraqi destruction of the oil installations, and the tangled 
aftermath of that war. Section XII discusses issues and conclusions some of which 
are specific to the events of the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict, and some of which are more 
general. 
Damage to the environment arising from the 1991 Gulf War raised many 
questions about whether such consequences of war can be effectively prevented or 
limited, and if so how. This was by no means the first major war to have raised 
such questions. However, a peculiar conjunction of circumstances meant that it 
did so in a sharp form. The war happened at a time when there was already great 
international concern about many environmental issues; it occurred in a region 
peculiarly rich in oil, a natural resource already notorious for its manifold effects 
on the environment; its maritime element was largely in an area of sea, the Gulf, 
which is enclosed and thus especially susceptible to pollution; it saw serious 
environmental damage-much of it apparently deliberate; and the war was 
conducted on one side in the name of the United Nations, which has also been 
deeply involved in various environmental issues. In the wake of the war, there was 
renewed concern in the international community with the whole question of 
environmental destruction in war.2 
Most, but not all, of the environmental issues were about oil. The oil slicks in 
the Gulf, the setting on fire of the Kuwaiti oil wells, the Coalition air attacks on 
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oil installations in Iraq-all seemed to involve, or threaten, damage of several 
kinds to the natural environment. Other activities in the war also had 
environmental aspects, including the dumping of quantities of mines and war 
material in the desert, the bombing of nuclear installations, and the damage to the 
water supply in Iraq. 
It is not my purpose to offer a scientific judgement on the damage to the 
environment caused by the 1991 Gulf War. It is particularly hard to assess the 
precise nature and extent of any damage to the natural environments of the earth's 
atmosphere, the waters of the Gulf, and the land in Kuwait and neighboring 
regions. Some predictions and preliminary estimates of such damage were made, 
and are mentioned later in this paper. They reflected disagreement about certain 
matters, including the extent to which the damage could be expected to be 
long-term in character. Further studies will certainly follow. There will then be 
additional questions to be examined: not least, to consider the extent to which the 
environmental effects of the war have in turn led to human suffering and death, 
threats to wildlife, damage to crops, and so on. Such studies will be one necessary 
aspect of any concerted international effort to consider what is to be done about 
the environmental consequences of war. 
What is not in dispute is that the conspicuous damage to the immediate 
environments ofIraq and Kuwait was, at least in the short term, serious. Kuwait 
itself was left by the retreating Iraqis an environmental disaster area on land, sea 
and air. Much of this damage involved a wanton waste of a precious natural 
resource, namely oil; and proved very difficult and expensive to counter. In Iraq, 
the damage affecting such public services as sewerage and water purification 
created a threat to the water supply and other man-made services, and thus to the 
population at large. Beyond these two countries most directly involved in war, the 
environmental threats of oil slicks and smoke clouds moved across frontiers to 
wherever the currents and winds took them. They caused damage to waters and 
on land in neutral States, especially Iran. 
Concern about the environmental consequences of war is not necessarily based 
on any assumption that the natural environment is something which in its existing 
state is wholly benign, or incapable of being improved by the hand of man. 
Impeccably natural earthquakes and eruptions can themselves cause damage, 
including damage to the environment, on a colossal scale. Nor is such concern 
based on any assumption that all damage caused by war to the environment is 
irreparable. Both natural and human agencies may greatly mitigate at least some 
of the effects of environmental damage. 
The events of the war raise the question of what exactly we mean by the 'natural 
environment'-to use the phrase which occurs in Additional Protocol I 1977.3 The 
idea that 'nature' and 'man' are in two separate categories has remained highly 
influential in this century, for example in shaping policies regarding national 
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parks in the United States and various other countries. However, many aspects of 
the environment in which we live, especially where land and fresh water are 
concerned, are an amalgam of the natural and the artificial: and damage to those 
aspects of our environment may be just as serious as damage to those parts which 
are nearer to being purely 'natural', such as the seas and the atmosphere. In the 
1991 Gulf War, much damage was inflicted by Iraq on the more purely 'natural' 
environments of sea and air, while the environmental damage by the Coalition was 
to the man-shaped environment within Iraq: it would be wrong to exclude the 
latter from this enquiry. 
The environmental consequences of the 1991 Gulf War do not have priority 
over other issues arising from the manner in which the war was conducted. 
Questions concerned with other matters, such as the treatment of the inhabitants 
of Kuwait, and of prisoners and hostages, demonstrably involved large numbers 
of human lives and vast human suffering. We should not be surprised that, in the 
midst of death and destruction, and daily fear of worse to come in the form of gas, 
bacteriological and nuclear warfare, the belligerents did not always have as their 
first consideration the protection of the natural environment over the medium or 
longterm.4 
Yet the environmental damage in the 1991 Gulf War did raise classic issues of 
a kind with which the laws of war have traditionally been concerned. The laws of 
war-sometimes known as international humanitarian law - have always sought 
to limit certain kinds of military activities which cause death, misery, and 
destruction to those not directly involved in a war, or which continue to wreak 
havoc long after the actual war is over. It is partly for this reason that they have 
been concerned with the protection of civilians, and of neutral countries, shipping 
and property; with the rules against certain uses of weapons (e.g. some types of 
mines) which are liable to detonate blindly and at the wrong time; and with the 
prohibitions of unnecessary destruction. Against this background, it is entirely 
natural that discussion of the laws of war today should encompass renewed 
consideration of the environmental aspects of modern war. 
The failure to prevent damage to the environment in the 1991 Gulf War was in 
marked contrast to a degree of success in preventing the conflict from getting out 
of hand in some other respects: many hostages, seized in the early weeks of the 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, were released before war broke out; Iraq was kept 
isolated; the war was kept within geographical limits and was brought to a swift 
conclusion; and gas, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons were not used. Why was 
there so conspicuous a failure over matters relating to the environment? 
II. WAR AND ENVIRONMENT IN EARLIER WARS AND WRITINGS 
Throughout history, wars have posed severe threats to at least the immediate 
environment. Scorched earth policies and deliberate flooding, whether offensive 
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or defensive, have had serious effects on cultivable land. Concern about damage 
to water supplies, orchards, crops and forests can be found in much writing and 
legal thinking about warfare over the centuries.s Early writings on the laws ofwar, 
including those of Hugo Grotius, show great concern over devastation of land, 
fields, trees and so on.6 
If the problem is perennial, the extent and depth of concern about it-the sense 
that natural resources are limited, the human environment fragile, and the 
problem global in character-is something which has clearly. grown in the 
post-1945 period. Geoffrey Best has reflected the common perception that there is 
a new factor here: 
The capacity of war to cause 'widespread, long-term and severe damage' to the natural 
environment constitutes a menace that is historically novel. Methods and means of 
warfare did not really place the doing of such damage to the natural environment 
within the reach of belligerents until World War II. What was however within their 
reach from earliest recorded times was the ability to destroy part of the anthropogenic 
environment. This history of civilization, past and present, scanned with a view to 
ascertaining what kinds and degrees of concern may have been shown about 
belligerents' religious, ethical or legal responsibilities in this respect discloses: (a) a 
small but consistent canon of laws and customs aiming to control the impact of 
hostilities on the anthropogenic environment; and (b) some lessons as to the value 
of those laws and customs and the value of the whole body of norms relating to warfare 
of which they form a part? 
In both world wars in this century, oil was a key bone of contention between 
the belligerents, and there were many cases of destruction of oil installations. 
However, such destruction was not generally seen at the time as an assault on the 
environment, nor as necessarily reprehensible. Thus, in the winter of 1916-17, 
when Romania was invaded by the forces of the Central Powers, the oilfields were 
destroyed on behalf of the Entente Powers: 
Three-quarters of the country had been lost, with all the fertile corn-bearing plains 
and the oil-fields, by far the most extensive in Europe. Happily, the latter were to 
yield nothing to the enemy for several months, for Colonel Norton Griffiths, an 
English member of Parliament, went round in a car systematically destroying them. 
Sometimes he barely escaped from enemy patrols, and had often to face the not 
unnatural hostility of the population; where time was lacking for him to set them on 
fire, they were put out of action by throwing obstructions down the pipes.8 
The Second Indochina War (the Vietnam War), which ended in 1975, saw 
massive programs of defoliation, forest-destruction, and attempts at rain-making: 
these were widely criticized internationally, and contributed greatly to 
international efforts to tackle environmental aspects of warfare.9 The U.S. 
Government appears to have recognized that the use of such weapons in 
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international war, outside the territory of a government which acquiesced in it, 
would be legally questionable. George Aldrich, from 1965 to 1977 a Legal Adviser 
for East Asian and Pacific Mfairs in the State Department, subsequently wrote: 
Even during the Vietnam War, when American armed forces used defoliants on a 
large scale, the legal advice given by the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State was 
that it would be prudent to limit their use to the territories of South Vietnam and 
Laos, where we had the consent of the Government of the territory, and avoid 
establishing a precedent for the first use of these novel chemical agents as weapons 
of war on the territory of either an adversary (North Vietnam) or a neutral 
(Cambodia). To the best of my knowledge, that advice was followed .... 10 
The Iran-Iraq War of1980-88 saw extensive environmental damage, some ofit 
resulting from the large-scale destruction of oil installations. There were 
numerous oil spills in the waters of the Gulf, the worst of which was in the Nowruz 
field off the coast ofIran in 1983, but none was quite on the scale of the major spill 
in the 1991 Gulf War. U.N. Security Council Resolution 540 of31 October 1983, 
condemning violations of international humanitarian law in this war, called on 
belligerents to stop hostilities in the Gulf, and to refrain from action threatening 
marine life there. 
III. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
International norms relating to the protection of the environment can be found 
in many quite different kinds of framework. There should be no automatic 
assumption that the laws of war are the only relevant body oflaw, or the only means 
of tackling a rather complex set of problems. Indeed, general political statements 
from the Stockholm Declaration 197211 to the Rio Declaration 1992,12 and also 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions, may be as important as formally binding 
agreements. There is also a growing number of general multilateral and other 
treaties relating directly or indirectly to the environment. Examples include not 
only the main treaties in the field of environmental law, but also the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty13, partly motivated by the desire to preserve the fragile ecology of the 
Antarctic; the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963,14 partly motivated by 
widespread concern about the effects of nuclear testing on the atmosphere and 
thereby on the food chain; and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention,15 which 
completely prohibits the possession of certain weapons of a type which could 
seriously impact the environment. 
Treaties with a bearing on the environment, though normally applicable in 
peacetime, may continue to be applied in wartime as well. Whether or not such 
treaties are formally applicable, belligerents may be expected to operate with due 
regard for their provisions. Further, such treaties may still govern relations 
between belligerents and neutrals. 
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The terms of many treaties were potentially relevant to practical issues faced in 
the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict. A few examples must suffice. The 1954 Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil deals with oil discharged from ships. 
However, it gives a higher priority to other values, including human life, when it 
specifies that the treaty does not apply to "the discharge of oil ... for the purpose 
of securing the safety of the ship, preventing damage to the ship or cargo, or saving 
life at sea.,,16 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,17 in force only since November 
1994, contains extensive obligations to protect the marine environment. 
Various bilateral and regional treaties were of particular significance in this 
war. The most important regional accord on environmental matters was the 
Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution 1978, to which many States in the region were 
parties, including Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In accord with its terms, 
the Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
(ROPME) was established, with headquarters in Kuwait. Remarkably, its Council 
had continued to hold meetings, with participation from both warring parties, 
during the Iran-Iraq War. During the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91, its 
staff fled, but its headquarters was not looted or taken over. ROPME did assist 
clean-up operations in 1991 and after.18 
IV. THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Despite the importance of other legal approaches, the laws of war, which 
attracted considerable attention in the 1991 Gulf War, are central to any discussion 
of efforts to control the environmental damage of war. If the environment is not 
to be ignored completely in the conduct of hostilities, then there is an obvious case 
for having specific rules relating to the protection of the environment, not just in 
general, but also in wartime. 
What, if anything, do the laws of war say about the environment? Sometimes 
it is asserted that the laws of war have failed entirely to address this problem: this 
is used as one argument for now creating a new international treaty on the subject. 
Thus, remarkably, the Soviet Minister of the Environment, Prof. Nikolai 
Vorontsov, wrote in May 1991: 
There was no sound scientific examination of the destruction caused to the 
environment during the war in Vietnam, no-lessons were learned. After the war, no 
measures on environmental protection in case of armed conflicts were worked out.19 
In fact, the provisions of the laws of war regarding the environment, while far 
from satisfactory, are by no means as lacking as Prof. Vorontsov suggested. This 
is one of the many areas in which the laws of war consist of a very disparate body 
of principles, treaties, customary rules, and practices, which have developed over 
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the centuries in response to a wide variety of practical problems and moral 
concerns. 
A. Underlying Principles of the Laws of War 
In considering what the laws of war have to say about environmental damage, 
it is necessary to start with their underlying principles, most of which seem to have 
a bearing on the question of environmental destruction. These principles, though 
ancient in origin, are reflected in many modern texts and military manuals. They 
include the principle of proportionality, particularly in its meaning of 
proportionality in relation to the adversary's military actions or to the anticipated 
military value of one's own actions; the principle of discrimination, which is about 
care in the selection of methods, of weaponry and of targets; the principle of 
necessity, under which belligerents may only use that degree and kind of force, not 
otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, which is required for the partial 
or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, 
and physical resources; and the closely-related principle of humanity, which 
prohibits the employment of any kind or degree of force not required for the 
purpose of the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum 
expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.20 
Each of these four principles strongly points to the conclusion that actions 
resulting in massive environmental destruction, especially where they do not serve 
a clear and important military purpose, would be questionable on many grounds, 
even in the absence of specific rules of war addressing environmental matters in 
detail. When the four principles are taken together, such a conclusion would seem 
inescapable. 
It has been suggested by Richard Falk that there are, in addition, two 'subsidiary 
principles' which "seem to be well-grounded in authoritative custom and to have 
relevance to the array of special problems posed by deliberate and incidental 
environmental harm." These are the principles of neutrality and ofinter-generational 
equity.21 The proposition that these are in fact key principles of the laws of war, 
though it may be unorthodox, is serious. Both these types of consideration do 
inform certain provisions of the laws of war, and do affect attitudes to 
environmental destruction. However, since these principles do not add greatly to 
existing law as reflected in the four principles already outlined and in treaties, it 
is not necessary to pursue the issue here. 
There are obvious limits to the value of customary principles as a basis for 
guiding the policies of States in wartime. As Richard Falk has said, in pessimistic 
vein: 
there are extreme limitations associated with a need to rely on these customary 
principles. Their formulation is general and abstract, and susceptible to extreme 
subjectivity and selectivity in their application to concrete circumstances.22 
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B. Treaties on the Laws o/War 
Can treaty law, with its more precise texts and its formal systems of adherence 
by States, overcome any limitations of the framework of principles as outlined 
above? In treaties on the laws of war, several kinds of prohibitions can be found 
which have a bearing on the protection of the environment in armed conflicts and 
in occupied territories: 
1. Many general rules protecting civilians, since these rules also imply protection of 
the environment on which the civilians depend.23 
2. Prohibitions of unnecessary destruction, and oflooting of civilian property. 
3. Prohibitions of attacks on certain objectives and areas (e.g., restrictions on the 
destruction of dikes). 
4. Prohibitions and restrictions on the use of certain weapons (e.g., gas, chemical and 
bacteriological). 
5. Prohibitions and restrictions on certain methods of war (e.g., the poisoning of wells, 
or the indiscriminate and unrecorded laying of mines). 
The word 'environment' does not occur in any treaty on the laws of war before 
1977. This does not mean that there was no protection of the environment, but 
rather that such protection is found in a variety of different forms and contexts. 
The pre-1977 treaties on the laws of war relate to protection of the environment 
obliquely rather than directly: they offer general statements of principle, and also 
some detailed regulations which may on occasion happen to be relevant to the 
environment. 
Thus, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration on explosive projectiles, in ringing 
words which were to prove terribly problematic in subsequent practice, declared 
that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.,,24 
Several of the Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 contained 
provisions with a bearing on the environment. In the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
on land war,25 the preamble refers to the need "to diminish the evils of war, as far 
as military requirements permit", and goes on to state in the famous Martens 
Clause: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection 
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of 
the public conscience.26 
In the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 22 states: 
"The right of belligerents to adopt means ofinjuring the enemy is not unlimited." 
Geoffrey Best has commented: "Post-1945 extensions of that principle from its 
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traditional application to enemy persons and properties to the natural 
environment are no more than logical, given the novel and awful circumstances 
that have suggested them.,,27 Article 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations is relevant 
to certain instances of environmental damage when it states that it is especially 
forbidden "to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." Also in the 
Regulations, Section III (which deals with military occupations) contains many 
provisions having a potential bearing on environmental protection. Article 55 is 
the most obvious, but not the only, example: 
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of 
public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile 
State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these 
properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct. 
It could be further argued that the rules relating to neutrality in war, as 
contained in 1907 Hague Convention V (in land war) and 1907 Hague Convention 
XIII (in naval war), by requiring belligerents to respect the sovereign rights of 
neutral powers, prohibit environmental damage seriously affecting a neutral 
State.28 This is a typical case in which protection of the environment, even where 
it is not mentioned in existing law, may nonetheless be a logical implication of 
such law. 
The 1925 Geneva Protocol on gas and bacteriological warfare29 provides one 
basis for asserting the illegality of forms of chemical warfare having a harmful 
effect on the environment. The Protocol has been the subject of a number of 
controversies as to its exact scope, and these controversies have included matters 
relating to the environment. In 1969, during the Second Indochina War, and 
following reports of U.S. use of chemicals in Vietnam, a U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution (which un surprisingly did not receive unanimous support) addressed 
the issue, declaring that the 1925 Protocol prohibits the use in armed conflicts of: 
(a) Any chemical agents of warfare - chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid 
or solid - which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, 
animals or plants; 
(b) Any biological agents of warfare -living organisms, whatever their nature, or 
infective material derived from them - which are intended to cause disease and 
death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability 
to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.30 
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions say little about the protection of the 
environment. They are concerned above all with the immediate and important 
task of protection of victims of war. However, one of these agreements, the 1949 
Geneva Convention IV (the Civilians Convention) builds on the similar provisions 
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of the 1907 Hague Regulations when it states in Article 53, which is in the section 
on occupied territories: 
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public 
authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.31 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary on this 
article contains the following assessment on the question of 'scorched earth' 
policies: 
A word should be said here about operations in which military considerations require 
recourse to a 'scorched earth' policy, i.e. the systematic destruction of whole areas by 
occupying forces withdrawing before the enemy. Various rulings of the courts after 
the Second World War held that such tactics were in practice admissible in certain 
cases, when carried out in exceptional circumstances purely for legitimate military 
reasons. On the other hand, the same rulings severely condemned recourse to 
measures of general devastation whenever they were wanton, excessive or not 
warranted by military operations.32 
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV, and similar articles in Conventions I and 
11,33 confirm that grave breaches of the Convention include "extensive destruction 
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly." 
The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention34 seeks to protect a broad range 
of objects, including groups of historic buildings, archaeological sites, and centers 
containing a large amount of cultural property. All such property is to be protected 
from exposure to destruction, damage, and pillage. In many cases, obviously, 
action which was wantonly destructive of the environment would also risk 
violating the provisions of this Convention. 
Environmental matters were addressed by name and directly in two laws of war 
agreements concluded in 1977. In both cases one important stimulus to new 
law-making was the Second Indochina War. Although neither of these treaties was 
formally in force in the 1991 Gulf War, they provide language and principles which 
may assist in defining and asserting the criminality of certain threats to the 
environment. 
The first of these two 1977 agreements is the U.N. Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques.35 This accord (otherwise known as the ENMOD Convention) was 
concluded mainly in reaction to the use by the United States of forest and crop 
destruction, and rain-making techniques, in the Second Indochina War. It deals, 
essentially, not with damage to the environment, but with the use of the forces of 
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the environment as weapons.36 Article I prohibits all "hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury" to the adversary. Article II then defines 
'environmental modification techniques as "any technique for changing -
through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, 
composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, 
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space." An authoritative U.N. 
understanding which was attached to the draft text of the Convention in 1976 
provides a non-exhaustive list of phenomena which could be caused by 
environmental modification techniques: these include, among other things, "an 
upset in the ecological balance of a region." 
The second of these 1977 laws of war agreements touching on the environment 
is the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.37 This accord, which is additional to the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions, contains extensive provisions protecting the civilian 
population and civilian objects. Article 48, entitled 'Basic Rule', states: 
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. 
Article 52, on 'General Protection of Civilian Objects', similarly provides a 
framework for protecting civilian objects, and thus has obvious implications for 
protection of the environment. 
In two of its articles, Additional Protocol I deals specifically with the question 
of damage to the natural environment. (This is distinct from the manipulation of 
the forces of the environment as weapons, which had been addressed in the 
ENMOD Convention.) Article 35, which is in a section on 'Methods and Means 
of Warfare', states in full (the third paragraph being the most explicit on the 
environment): 
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods 
and means of warfare is not unlimited. 
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may 
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment. 
The second article in Additional Protocol I referring specifically to damage to 
the environment is in the chapter on 'Civilian Objects', which is within the section 
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of the Protocol dealing with protection of the civilian population against the effects 
of hostilities. Article 55 states in full: 
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of 
the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to 
cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health 
or survival of the population. 
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. 
The IeRe commentary notes that the 'care shall be taken' formula in the first 
paragraph of Article 55 leaves some latitude for judgment, whereas the second 
paragraph contains an absolute prohibition. 38 In all cases, it is clear that the phrase 
'widespread, long-term and severe damage' excludes a great deal of minor and 
short-term environmental damage. Bothe, Partsch and Solf say: 
Arts. 35(3) and 55 will not impose any significant limitation on combatants waging 
conventional warfare. It seems primarily directed to high level policy decision 
makers and would affect such unconventional means of warfare as the massive use 
of herbicides or chemical agents which could produce widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment.39 
The rules regarding the environment in Articles 35 and 55 have produced some 
rather varied responses. The UK delegation in the negotiations was cool about the 
inclusion of the clause relating to the environment in Article 35: "We consider 
that it is basically in order to protect the civilians living in the environment that 
the environment itself is to be protected against attack. Hence, the provision on 
protection of the environment is in our view rightly placed in the section on 
protection of civilians.,,40 
In its examination of both Articles 35 and 55, the IeRe commentary considers 
the meaning of'long-term', suggesting that it refers to decades rather than months. 
This may exclude much environmental damage. However, the commentary does 
make it clear that the term 'natural environment' should be interpreted broadly, 
referring as it does to the "system of inextricable interrelations between living 
organisms and their inanimate environment." Indeed, the last words of Article 55, 
paragraph 1, imply such a connection between the environment and humankind.41 
The commentary says: 
The concept of the natural environment should be understood in the widest sense to 
cover the biological environment in which a population is living. It does not consist 
merely of the objects indispensable to survival mentioned in Article 54 ... but also 
includes forests and other vegetation mentioned in the Convention of 10 October 
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1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
as well as fauna, flora and other biological or climatic elements.42 
Article 54, mentioned in the preceding quotation, is one of a number of other 
provisions in the same chapter of Additional Protocol I which, while not 
mentioning the environment by name, do in fact prohibit certain forms of military 
action destructive of the environment. Thus Article 54, paragraph"2, states (subject 
to certain important provisos in paragraphs 3 and 5): 
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the 
production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies 
and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance 
value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether 
in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive. 
Still in the chapter on 'Civilian Objects', Article 56 deals with 'Protection of 
works and installations containing dangerous forces'. Paragraph 1 (subject to 
certain provisos in paragraph 2) states: 
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these 
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population .. Other military 
objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be 
made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian 
population. 
This article is qualified by the second paragraph, which in effect says that the 
protection it offers ceases if the military objective in question is used in regular, 
significant, and direct support of military operations. Despite this qualification, 
during the 1980s the U.S. government argued that the article gave too great a degree 
ofimmunity to dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations.43 A further 
U.S. criticism was that "the provisions of Article 56 purposely use the word 'attack' 
rather than 'destroy' (as was contained in the original ICRC proposal) in order to 
preserve the right of a defender to release dangerous forces to repel an 
attacker .... ,,44 However, the article plainly does not give total immunity from 
attack. Where hydroelectric generating stations or nuclear power plants are 
contributing to a grid in regular, significant, and direct support of military 
operations, militarily necessary attacks against them are not prohibited.45 
Others have suggested that Article 56 did not go far enough, or that it should 
be interpreted to cover a wider range of works and installations containing 
dangerous forces than the words "namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical 
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generating stations" might suggest.46 This latter view does not reflect the 
negotiating history of Article 56. This particular article does not cover the question 
of attacking other kinds of installations containing dangerous forces: for example, 
factories manufacturing toxic products, and oil facilities. The ICRC commentary 
indicates that such installations were excluded from Article 56, but may be covered 
by other articles: 
Several delegations wished to include other installations in the list, in particular oil 
production installations and storage facilities for oil products. It appears that the 
consultations were not successful, and the sponsors of proposals in this field finally 
withdrew them. There is no doubt that Article 55 ... will apply to the destruction of 
oil rigs resulting in oil gushing into the sea and leading to extensive damage such as 
that described in that article. As regards the destruction and setting alight of 
refineries and petroleum storage facilities, it is hardly necessary to stress the grave 
danger that may ensue for the civilian popUlation. Extending the special protection 
to such installations would undoubtedly have posed virtually insoluble problems, 
and it is understandable that the Conference, when it adopted these important 
prohibitions, limited them to specific objects.47 
Much else in Additional Protocol I has a bearing on the environment. Thus, in 
the chapter on Civil Defence, which seeks to give protection to various measures 
intended to alleviate the effects of hostilities or disasters, the tasks of civil defense 
forces are so defined in Article 61 as to include, inter alia: decontamination and 
similar protective measures; emergency repair of indispensable public utilities; 
and assistance in the preservation of objects essential for surviva1.48 
Given that Additional Protocol I was not binding as a treaty during the 1991 
war, can its key rules on the environment be said to reflect customary law? A 
number of general rules which have implications for the environment, including 
Article 48 and much of Article 52, are widely accepted as customary law. As to 
Articles 35(3) and 55, which specifically mention the environment, Prof. 
Greenwood acknowledges that they have been viewed by Germany and the United 
States as representing a new rule; he then states: 
Nevertheless, while there is likely to be continuing controversy about the extent of 
the principle contained in Article 35(3), the core of that principle may well reflect an 
emerging norm ofintemationallaw. 
As to Article 56, he suggests that there are grounds for doubting whether the 
special additional protection it affords to dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations 
has the status of customary law.49 
Only one other laws of war agreement refers specifically to the environment: 
the 1981 U.N. Convention on Specific Conventional Weapons.SO The preamble 
repeats the exact words of Additional Protocol I, Article 35(3), which were quoted 
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in full above, and also recalls a number of other general principles which could 
have a bearing on environmental damage. Protocol III annexed to the Convention 
deals with incendiary weapons. Article 2, paragraph 4 of that Protocol states, in a 
notably weak formulation: 
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or 
camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military 
objectives. 
C. CaseLaw 
In addition to treaties, past cases are an important guide to the law. In the 
Second World War there was much general devastation, on many fronts in both 
Europe and Asia. Some of this resulted in charges of wanton destruction at 
post-war trials. 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did not 
specifically mention the environment, but it did include in its catalogue of war 
crimes "plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity." In the Tribunal's 
trial of the major German war criminals in 1945-46, there was a great deal of 
evidence about such destruction. One of the defendants, General Alfred JodI, was 
inter alia found guilty of war crimes including scorched earth destruction in respect 
of North Norway, Leningrad, and Moscow.51 
Many post-Second World War cases before national tribunals related to 
environmentally damaging abuse of natural resources in occupied territories. In 
respect of one Polish case, the United Nations War Crimes Commission was asked 
to determine whether ten German civilian administrators, each of whom had been 
the head of a department in the Forestry Administration in occupied Poland in 
1939-44, could be listed as war criminals on a charge of pillaging Polish public 
property. It was alleged that the accused had caused "the wholesale cutting of 
Polish timber to an extent far in excess of what was necessary to preserve the timber 
resources of the country." The U.N. War Crimes Committee agreed thatprimafacie 
evidence of the existence of a war crime had been shown, and nine of the ten 
officials charged were listed as accused war criminals.52 
On the other hand, in one post-war case, scorched-earth policies by a retreating 
occupying power were not ruled to be necessarily illegal. In the case of United 
States v. Wilhelm List (also called the Hostages Case), a U.S. military tribunal at 
Nuremberg found one of the defendants, General Lothar Rendulic, not guilty on 
a part of the charge against him based on scorched earth. In the winter of 1944-45, 
he had been in charge of retreating German forces in northern Norway. As a 
precautionary measure against a possible attack by advancing Soviet forces, he had 
destroyed housing, communication and transport facilities in the area. The court 
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said that the defendant "may have erred in the exercise of his judgement but he 
was guilty of no criminal act." This part of the judgment was intensely 
controversial in Norway, and was discussed in the Storting on several occasions. 
It was widely felt that these German devastations, which had continued up to 6 
May 1945, went far beyond the demands of military realism.53 
V. PROBLEMS OF THE LEGAL PROVISIONS AS THEY STOOD IN 1990 
A. General Problems 
Before the events of the Gulf Conflict of 1990-91, international law in general, 
and the laws of war in particular, had not been silent on the matter of 
environmental damage in war. Yet there are many bases of criticism of the rules 
as they stood in 1990. The provisions were dispersed in too many types of sources 
and in too many different agreements; they lacked specificity; they relied heavily 
on the always hazardous process whereby commanders balance military necessity 
against other considerations; they had not caught up with the growing concern in 
many countries about environmental issues; and the means of investigating 
complaints and punishing violations were not always clear. Above all, there was 
no effective means of ensuring that an admittedly disparate set of principles and 
rules was actually accepted, understood, and implemented; and there was much 
scope for disagreement about what were acceptable targets and methods where 
risks to the environment were involved.54 
Treaties on the laws of war, before 1977, contained no mention of the word 
'environment'; and their provisions can be said to relate to the environment only 
indirectly. They do so through prohibitions of wanton destruction; and also 
through protection of property, whether public or private - an approach which 
has limits as some environmental 'goods', such as the air we breathe, are not 
property. Despite such weaknesses, these older rules constituted the strongest legal 
basis for asserting the illegality of much environmental destruction in war. 
Finally, some of the newer laws-of-war rules which attempt to deal directly with 
protection of the environment-especially those in the 1977 Additional Protocol 
I and in the ENMOD Convention-had serious limitations, some of which have 
been mentioned above. They had also failed to secure universal assent: this is 
indicated by the U.S. attitude to the Protocol, discussed next. During the 1990-91 
crisis there was a tendency in public statements about environmental damage to 
refer mainly to these newer rules, because they do mention the word 'environment' 
as such, whereas legally stronger and more directly relevant provisions from earlier 
treaties received less attention. 
B. U.S. Attitudes to the Environmental Provisions of Additional Protocol I 
Of all the laws of war sources which have been cited, the Additional Protocol I 
might seem to have the clearest and most explicit provisions about damage to the 
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environment. Yet these provisions are not without problems, both as regards their 
substance and as regards the non-participation of certain important States, 
especially the United States, in this agreement. U.S. official and non-official 
thinking on Additional Protocol I is more open than that in other States, and 
merits scrutiny. 
Despite its non-accession to Additional Protocol I, the U.S. Government had 
explicitly recognized, long before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, that many of this 
agreement's provisions either reflect customary law, or merit support on other 
grounds. The key question, therefore, is whether the U.s. Government takes such 
a view of the provisions which have a bearing on protection of the environment. 
When, on 29 January 1987, President Reagan transmitted Additional Protocol 
II to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, he said in his letter 
of transmittal: 
... we can reject Protocol I as a reference for humanitarian law, and at the same time 
devise an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be 
of real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed 
conflicts. We are therefore in the process of consulting with our allies to develop 
appropriate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that 
govern our military operations, and as customary international law. I will advise the 
Senate of the results of this initiative as soon as it is possible to do so.55 
Earlier in January 1987, Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, United 
State Department of State, had given a fuller account of U.S. Government thinking 
about Additional Protocol I. He acknowledged that U.S. non-ratification left a gap, 
and gave some indication as to how it might be filled: 
Protocol I cannot be now looked to by actual or potential adversaries of the United 
States or its allies as a definitive indication of the rules that U.S. forces will observe 
in the event of armed conflict and will expect its adversaries to observe. To fill this 
gap, the United States and its friends would have to give some alternative clear 
indication of which rules they consider binding or otherwise propose to observe . 
. . . in our discussions with our allies to date we have not attempted to reach an 
agreement on which rules are presently customary law, but instead have focused on 
which principles are in our common interests and therefore should be observed and 
in due course recognized as customary law, whether they are presently part of that 
law or not.56 
Mr Matheson went on to list "the principles that we believe should be observed 
and in due course recognized as customary law, even if they have not already 
achieved that status ... " His partial listing of these principles did not include those 
which explicitly address the protection of the natural environment. Indeed, he 
indicated that the U.S. administration was opposed to the principle in Article 35 
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regarding the natural environment, saying that it was "too broad and ambiguous 
and is not a part of customary law.,,57 He was also reported as expressing U.S. 
opposition to the rule on protection of the environment in Article 55 on the ground 
that it was: 
too broad and too ambiguous for effective use in military operations. He concluded 
that the means and methods of warfare that have such a severe effect on the natural 
environment so as to endanger the civilian population may be inconsistent with other 
general principles, such as the rule of proportionality . 58 
Matheson and Judge Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser, United State Department 
of State, also criticized in detail the provisions of Article 56, concerning works and 
installations containing dangerous forces; as have some subsequent official U.S. 
writings.59 
In the public polemics about whether or not the U.S. should ratify Additional 
Protocol I, there had not been a systematic and sustained debate about these 
particular provisions bearing on the environment. George Aldrich did go so far as 
to assert that these provisions may be verging on the status of customary law: 
While these provisions of Articles 35 and 55 are clearly new law - 'rules established 
by the Protocol' - I would not be surprised to see them quickly accepted as part of 
customary international law insofar as non-nuclear warfare is concerned ... 60 
Despite such optimism, the awkward truth is that the U.S. went into the 1991 
Gulf War against a background of scepticism, not just generally about Additional 
Protocol I, but particularly about those of its provisions that explicitly mention 
the environment. Further, the initiatives to consult allies to determine which of 
the Protocol's provisions were generally acceptable had not led to any published 
results by the start ofl991.61 These facts may have hampered the U.S. from placing 
much explicit reliance on provisions in Additional Protocol I, even though there 
were many which were accepted in practice and did have at least an indirect bearing 
on environmental protection. 
VI. APPLICABILITY OF LAWS OF WAR IN THE 1990-91 GULF 
CONFLICT 
From 2 August 1990 - the day when armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait 
began - many laws of war agreements were, beyond any serious doubt, formally 
in force as regards the Iraqi occupation and the subsequent war. (The term 
'conflict' is used here to refer to both the occupation and the war.) Some other 
agreements were not formally in force. 
The following sections show which of the principal States involved in, or 
directly affected by, the conflict were formal parties to the relevant accords. The 
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positions of fourteen States, chosen somewhat arbitrarily, are considered here: 
Canada, Egypt, France, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Turkey, U.K., and U.S. 
This is obviously not intended as a complete list: forty-two countries provided 
contributions to the Coalition, of which twenty-eight took part in military 
activities in the region: yet only ten of them appear in this list. In addition, many 
other States in the region were involved in the war and its consequences in some 
other way. 
A. Agreements in Force in the Gulf Conflict 
The laws of war agreements under the following three headings were beyond 
any serious doubt formally in force. 
1. 1907 Hague Convention IV and Regulations on Land Warfare. Although by no 
means all the States involved in the conflict were formally parties to this accord, or 
to the very similar one of 1899, the Hague Convention No. IV and Regulations are 
widely accepted as part of international customary law, binding on all States. They 
govern the conduct of occupation forces as well as armed combat. (Other 1907 Hague 
Conventions also contained many relevant provisions, especially No. V on Neutrality 
in Land War, No. VIII on Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, No. IX on 
Bombardment by Naval Forces, and No. XIII on Neutrality in Naval War.)62 
2. 1925 Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare.63 All fourteen States 
listed above were parties to this treaty, which prohibits the use in war of gas, chemical 
and bacteriological weapons. 
3. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions on Protection of Victims of War. 64 All fourteen 
States (and indeed virtually all States in the international community) were parties 
to these treaties, which govern, respectively: I - Wounded and Sick; II - Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea; III - Prisoners of War; IV - Civilians, especially in 
occupied territory, and under internment. 
In addition, because Iraq and Kuwait were both parties, the 1954 Hague 
Cultural Property Convention and Protocol6S was in force, at least as regards Iraq's 
occupation of Kuwait. Although three of the fourteen States listed above were not 
parties - Canada (which had not signed at all), and U.K. and U.S. (which had 
signed but not ratified) - they have observed the Convention's main provisions 
in practice. As the convention's relevance to environmental protection is limited, 
its application in the 1991 Gulf War is not pursued here. 
B. Agreements Not Fully in Force in the Gulf Conflict 
Certain key agreements were not fully in force for all parties to this conflict. 
The three most recent laws of war agreements - and the only ones to mention the 
environment by name - all fell into this category. 
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The 1977 Convention on Environmental Modification Techniques66 entered 
into force in a general way on 5 October 1978. Of the fourteen countries listed 
above, only six (Canada, Egypt, Italy, Kuwait, U.K,. and U.S.) were parties. Four 
(Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey) had signed but not ratified. Four (France, Israel, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) had not signed or acceded at all. It is possible that States 
parties were still obliged to implement this agreement in the war. 
The 1977 Additional Protocol 167 entered into force in a general way on 7 
December 1978. Of the fourteen countries listed above, only six (Canada, Italy, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) were parties. Again, four (Egypt, Iran, 
U.K., and U.S.) had signed but not ratified. Four (France, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey) 
had not signed or acceded at all.68 According to its Article 1, paragraph 3, this 
treaty applies in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions: in other words, it applies as between States parties, who are 
also obliged to apply it in relations with a non-party if the latter accepts and applies 
the treaty's provisions. Since Iraq showed no sign of doing this, and since a 
significant number of its adversaries were not parties, the Protocol cannot be said 
to have been in force in the Gulf conflict. However, as noted below, certain States 
not parties to the Protocol (including the U.S.) did make moves towards 'accepting 
and applying' some of the Protocol's provisions in this conflict. 
The 1981 U.N. Convention on Specific Conventional Weapons69 was also not 
formally in force in the Gulf conflict. Indeed, the only one of the fourteen States 
listed above to have become legally bound by it (through signature and ratification) 
was France; and France, at ratification of this Convention, had only accepted its 
Protocols I and II - not Protocol ilIon incendiary weapons. 
Despite the fact that they were not formally in force in this war, these three 
agreements were potentially relevant to the Gulf conflict in a number of 
overlapping ways. Firstly, to the extent that some of their provisions were 
accepted as an expression of customary international law, they were binding 
on all States. Secondly, many States could in practice, as a matter of policy as 
much as of formal legal obligation, choose to observe norms outlined in these 
agreements; and the language used in these accords provided one basis for 
pronouncements, including by U.S. authorities, about policy controlling the 
use of force in this conflict. 
C. JCRC Statements on Applicability of Law 
From 2 August 1990 onwards, in extensive direct contacts with the 
governments concerned, and also in press releases, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross repeatedly reminded the States involved in the Kuwait crisis of 
their legal obligations under the laws of war.1° The most detailed of these 
reminders was in a Memorandum on the Applicability of International 
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Humanitarian Law, sent to the 164 parties to the Geneva Conventions in 
mid-December 1990. This included the following statements: 
The following general rules are recognized as binding on any partY to an armed 
conflict: 
- the parties to a conflict do not have an unlimited right to choose the methods and 
means of injuring the enemy; 
- a distinction must be made in all circumstances between combatants and military 
objectives on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the other. It is 
forbidden to attack civilian persons or objects or to launch indiscriminate attacks; 
- all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid loss of civilian life or damage to 
civilian objects, and attacks that would cause incidental loss of life or damage which 
would be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated are 
prohibited. 
The ICRC invites States which are not partY to 1977 Protocol I to respect, in the event 
of armed conflict, the following articles of the Protocol, which stem from the basic 
principle of civilian immunitY from attack: 
- Article 54: protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population; 
- Article 55: protection of the natural environment; 
-Article 56: protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces.71 
This, and other ICRC statements, could be criticized, especially for their 
emphasis on Additional Protocol I 1977, not technically in force in this conflict. 
Certain other principles and rules (for example the prohibition of wanton 
destruction in Geneva Convention IV, 1949) might have provided a legally sounder 
and politically more acceptable basis for protection of the environment. 
In a press release issued on 1 February 1991, over ten days after the major Iraqi 
oil spills into the Gulf had begun, the ICRC issued another warning against 
environmental destruction: 
The right to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. Weapons having 
indiscriminate effects and those likely to cause disproportionate suffering and 
damage to the environment are prohibited.72 
D. The Problem of Iraqi Compliance 
A central problem with the application of the law was that Iraq tried to escape 
its obligations. After 2 August 1990, when the ICRC was seeking to carry out 
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humanitarian activities in Kuwait, the Iraqi authorities denied that the conflict 
was an international one. Various ICRC efforts in autumn 1990 to getIraq to accept 
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions were unsuccessful.73 After the 
beginning of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, the definition of the 
hostilities as international does not appear to have been contested by any party, 
butIraq was still not forthcoming about its legal obligations. It only began to accept 
them (for example, in relation to prisoners of war) around the time of the liberation 
of Kuwait and cease-fire at the end of February 1991. 
VII. PRE-WAR WARNINGS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
Before war actually broke out on the night of 16-17 January 1991, there was 
more than adequate warning of possible environmental damage in the event of a 
war over Kuwait. Iraq consistently threatened to set fire to the oilfields. On 23 
September 1990, Saddam Hussein said in a statement that if there was a war, 
Iraq would strike at the oilfields of the Middle East and Israe1.74 On 23 
December, in immediate response to tough comments in Cairo by the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, the Iraqi Defense Minister said in 
Baghdad: "Cheney and his aides will see how the land will burn under their 
feet not only in Iraq but ... also in Eastern Saudi Arabia, where the Saudi 
fighters will also feel the land burn.,,75 
These Iraqi statements, like the threats to use hostages as human shields, appear 
to have further solidified international opinion against Iraq?6 To the extent that 
this is so, it confirms the complexity and importance of the links between jus in 
bello andjus ad bellum. 
The scope of the potential environmental threat of a war over Kuwait was 
heavily publicized in the weeks before the war, but mainly by those arguing that 
war should be avoided altogether. King Hussein ofJordan gave such a warning at 
the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in November 1990. Similarly, at 
a symposium of scientists held in London on 2 January 1991 it was suggested that 
a large proportion of the oil wells had been mined and might be ignited by the 
Iraqis; that the resulting fi~'es might burn up to 3 million barrels of crude oil a day; 
and that oil spilt from damaged wells and pipelines would flow into the Gulf, 
causing a spill "10 to 100 times the size of the Valdez disaster." (It was apparently 
assumed that the large spill envisaged would happen as a by-product of general 
damage to wells, rather than as a result of deliberate Iraqi policy.) Some, including 
Dr. Abdullah Toukan, chief scientific adviser to King Hussein of Jordan, argued 
that a war in the Gulf would lead to a "global environmental catastrophe," 
including a "mini nuclear winter." Dr. John Cox, calling for a computer simulation 
(and accepting that it might show that "my fears are groundless") said of the 
possible effect on the Middle East climate: "We must not wait until six months 
after the fires are burning, and we see 500 million people starving as a result of 
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climate changes, then have scientists asking what caused it all." He also suggested 
that smoke from oil fires could scavenge ozone in the stratosphere, causing an 
ozone hole over the Indian sub-continent. However, at least one speaker at the 
symposium, Basil Buder, a managing director ofBP, challenged claims that the 
war would trigger a climate change which would dry up the monsoons in Asia, 
leaving a billion people to starve. He did not deny that there would be serious local 
problems: "We do have a very major problem on our hands to deal with well fires 
in Kuwait ifthe wells are mined and the heads blown offby the Iraqis.',77 
The vast scale of the envisaged environmental catastrophe was used by many 
as an argument against resorting to war at all as a means of liberating Kuwait. 
Thus, in much of the political debate of the time, to be environmentally 
concerned was to predict global catastrophe, and to be anti-war; while those 
who supported the resort to war said little about the environmental aspects of 
a possible war. This polarization of the debate had a serious consequence. There 
was litde if any public discussion of the means which might be used, if there was 
a war, to dissuade Iraq from engaging in environmentally destructive acts; and 
litde if any reference to the laws of war as one possible basis for seeking limitations 
ofthis kind. 
In the weeks before and after the outbreak of war in January 1991, the British 
Government examined the possible environmental impact of massive oil fires. On 
4 January, the Energy Secretary, John Wakeham, said: 
Oil fires of this magnitude would certainly be unpleasant, environmentally harmful 
and wasteful of energy resources, and if there were a large number it might take over 
six months to put them all out. But suggestions of a global environmental disaster 
are entirely misplaced?8 
In the last days before the war, President Bush tried to impress upon President 
Hussein the key importance of certain limits. In a letter which Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Tariq Aziz refused to accept from Secretary of State James Baker at 
Geneva on Wednesday 9 January 1991, President Bush wrote: 
... the United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons, 
support of any kind for terrorist actions, or the destruction of Kuwait's oil fields and 
installations. Further, you will be held directly responsible for terrorist actions 
against any member of the Coalition. The American people would demand the 
strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you 
order unconscionable acts of this sort?9 
VIII. PRE-WAR ROLE OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
In the long period between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the beginning 
of the war, the U.N. Security Council was unprecedentedly active; but it did 
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relatively little to focus attention on the need to respect laws of war limitations in 
the event of an armed conflict; and it did even less about threats to the 
environment. Security Council Resolution 670 of2S September 1990, which was 
basically about sanctions on air transport to Iraq, contained at the end a paragraph 
in which the Council reaffirmed: 
that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting 
Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in 
particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed 
by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches. 
Clearly this related primarily to the occupation of Kuwait, and did not 
specifically address the matter oflimitations which would apply in any war for the 
liberation of Kuwait. 
Security Council Resolution 674 of 29 October 1990 was the most detailed on 
humanitarian law issues. After repeating the above-quoted passage from 
Resolution 670, it demanded that Iraq desist from taking third-State nationals 
hostage, from mistreatment of inhabitants and third-State nationals in Kuwait, 
and from any other actions in violation, inter alia, of Geneva Convention IV. It 
then indicated that certain violations might be punished: it invited "States to 
collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the 
grave breaches by Iraq ... and to make this information available to the Security 
Council;" and it reminded Iraq that it was liable for any loss, damage or injury 
arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, referring also to the question of 
financial compensation. However, for all its merits, Resolution 674 did not spell 
out the principles or rules which would apply in a possible war. 
The famous Security Council decision authorizing the use of force -
Resolution 678 of29 November 1990-said nothing at all about laws of war limits; 
it was the last resolution before the outbreak of war. 
In the circumstances of the time, even the obvious could benefit from 
reaffirmation, and in addition some matters did need clarification and 
interpretation. In view ofIraq's cavalier attitude to basic rules, as evidenced for 
example in the weeks and months after 2 August 1990 by the seizure of hostages 
and the threats to destroy the oil installations, it was clear that any reminders to 
Iraqi commanders about limitations in war might need to come from outside. New 
environmental threats and public environmental concerns strengthened the case 
for having a clear statement about how environmental destruction ran counter to 
older as well as newer agreements on the laws of war. Further, in view of the lack 
of formal applicability of Additional Protocol I in this conflict, it could have been 
helpful if the U.N. had clarified whether at least some of its underlying principles 
and basic rules, such as those contained in Articles 35 and 48, were to be applied. 
The need to harmonize practices among the many members of the Coalition, and 
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to be seen to have done so, heightened the case for some U.N. statement on such 
matters. Fears of U.S. sensitivities about Additional Protocol I might have 
inhibited some from raising this issue. However, since the U.S. Government had 
itself many years earlier conceded that the U.S. non-ratification of the Additional 
Protocol left a gap, it would have been reasonable for the U.N. to have attempted, 
at least partially, to fill that gap. Although there were precedents from earlier crises 
for action in this field being taken by the General Assembly, and by the 
Secretary-General, in 1990-91 the obvious forum for such a role would have been 
the Security Council. 
IX. THE 1991 WAR 
A. Initial Coalition Policy Statements 
After the start of Operation Desert Storm on the night of 16-17 January 1991, 
statements by some Coalition governments placed an, albeit limited, emphasis on 
laws of war issues; but these were mostly of a rather general character, and 
contained few specific references to the protection of the environment or the 
avoidance of wanton destruction. 
The initial address to the nation by President Bush on the evening ofl6 January 
did specify that targets which U.S. forces were attacking were military in character, 
but the speech contained no other indication of the limits applicable to the 
belligerents under the laws ofwar.80 
In remarks made on 16-18 January, Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
and Lt. Gen. Chuck Horner, Commander of the U.S. Central Command Air 
Forces, particularly stressed that the bombing campaign would avoid civilian 
objects and religious centers. Some of their words on this point echoed the words 
of Additional Protocol I, Article 48, "the Basic Rule," cited above. 
During the war, the U.S. armed forces appear to have placed much emphasis 
on operating within established legal limits. General Colin Powell, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war, said subsequently: "Decisions were 
impacted by legal considerations at every level. Lawyers proved invaluable in the 
decision-making process.,,81 
There appear to have been some official American attempts to gag discussion 
of the environmental effects of the war. On 25 January 1991, researchers at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory received a memorandum which read 
in part: 
DOE [Department of Energy] Headquarters Public Affairs has requested that all 
DOE facilities and contractors immediately discontinue any further discussion of 
war-related research and issues with the media until further notice. The extent of 
what we are authorized to say about environmental impacts offires/oil spills in the 
Middle East follows: 
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"Most independent studies and experts suggest that the catastrophic 
predictions in some recent news reports are exaggerated. We are currently 
reviewing the matter, but these predictions remain speculative and do not 
warrant any further comment at this time.,,82 
The British Government, at the start of Operaiton Desert Storm, stressed that 
the Coalition forces were operating within a framework of legal and moral 
restraint. Prime Minister John Major told the House of Commons on 17 January: 
I also confirm that the instructions that have been given to all the allied pilots are to 
minimise civilian casualties wherever that is possible, and the targets that they have 
been instructed to attack are, without exception, military targets or targets of strategic 
importance.83 
At the beginning of the war there do not appear to have been any British 
Government statements of a general character about the laws of war as they bear 
on the environment, but such statements were made in February (see below) in 
the context of condemnations ofIraqi conduct. 
B.lraqi Auacks on Oil Facilities 
During the war, many military actions on both sides involved oil targets but 
were not necessarily seen as war crimes. The Coalition made attempts (occasionally 
breached) to avoid targeting tankers and commercial oil facilities in Kuwait; but 
oil depots and refineries in Iraq were viewed as military targets and hit by Coalition 
bombing. This brief survey concentrates on Iraqi actions, especially in occupied 
Kuwait. 
Soon after the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi forces launched 
an attack against the Khafji oil storage depot in northern Saudi Arabia, setting it 
on fire, and reportedly causing leakage of oil into the Gulf. Iraqi forces also caused 
a much larger slick, reportedly from as early as 19 January, by pumping huge 
quantities of oil into the Gulf from the Sea Island Terminal, a pumping station 
for the Mina al Ahmadi crude oil tank farm in Kuwait. This spill was reportedly 
reduced by Coalition forces accidentally setting the terminal ablaze on the night 
of 25-6 January; and it was eventually brought under partial control by Coalition 
bombing of the pumping stations at Mina al Ahmadi on 26 January.84 
At about the same time, there were also huge spills into the Gulf - again, 
apparently deliberate Iraqi acts - from Iraqi tankers moored at Mina al Ahmadi. 
By 24 January, when air reconnaissance in the area was conducted, these ships 
were apparently empty, or almost empty, of oil.8S 
The total amount of oil spilled into the Gulf almost certainly constituted the 
largest oil spill ever. Estimates at the time of the total amount of oil ranged up to 
eleven million or more barrels of crude.86 By mid-February, reports of the scale, 
movement, and likely damage of the oil slicks were slightly less apocalyptic than 
248 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
earlier.87 The true size of the spill was probably between six and nine million 
barrels.88 
The total damage done by the slicks was considerable. By May, over 400 
kilometres of the Saudi coast, as well as the southern Kuwaiti coast, was affected. 
There was damage to coastal marshlands, to wildlife (over 30,000 marine birds 
killed), to coastal flora, to fishing, and to offshore oil operations.89 
The massive, indeed in its scale unprecedented, destruction of the oilfields of 
Kuwait was the most efficiently conducted Iraqi action since the start of the war. 
It had been carefully prepared. A small group of oil installations in southern 
Kuwait was set on fire by the Iraqi forces during the first week of the war, evidently 
as a test.90 Then on 21-22 February, just before the Coalition ground offensive 
began on 23-24 February, Iraq started the program of systematic destruction of 
Kuwaiti oil installations, casting a huge pall of smoke across the country. Before 
the flight of Iraqi forces from Kuwait ended on 28 February, they blew up or 
damaged virtually all the oil installations in Kuwait. 613 wells were set on fire, and 
175 others left gushing or damaged. As to the rate of bum, estimates ranged 
between over two and six million barrels per day.91 
Most of these Iraqi actions regarding oil seem to have had little military 
rationale. Kuwait later claimed that the environmental devastation was not the 
result of military conflict, but "the product of a deliberate act that was planned in 
the very first days of the brutal Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.,,92 Some have 
speculated that the oil slicks in the Gulf were intended to hamper possible efforts 
at amphibious landings in Kuwait: however, quite apart from the doubtfully 
relevant fact that (as emerged later) the Coalition's preparations for such landings 
were a ruse, it is debatable whether, given their location, the slicks would have 
seriously hampered any amphibious landings. Oil damage to ships, especially to 
their cooling systems, could have been serious, but the Coalition powers managed 
by various means to avoid it.93 As to the burning of the oil wells, there is no 
evidence that Iraq actually intended to achieve a military effect by this means. 
However, the huge smoke clouds caused by the fires, and poor weather during the 
last week of the war, did significantly impede air operations over Kuwait, 
including reconnaissance and ground attack. As the Pentagon interim report (but 
not the final one) put it: 
The operational impact of oil fires and smoke on the Coalition forces attacking 
Kuwait City was mixed. Air support was severely hampered. As direction and 
strength shifted, surface winds initially complicated then ultimately favored 
Coalition forces by blowing from south to north during the ground offensive.94 
Thus, while Iraq's releasing of oil and destruction of oilfields had some marginal 
military effect, or at least potential, there is no evidence that that was the purpose. 
The Pentagon expressed puzzlement about the purpose.95 Almost certainly, Iraq's 
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motive was less tactical than punitive: to do damage to Kuwait, hurt its adversary 
and neighbor, and diminish the value of the prize for which the war was supposedly 
being fought. The fact that only Kuwaiti wells were set alight, and not those on 
the Iraqi side of the border, confirms this conclusion; as does the fact that explosive 
charges were used, rather than simple ignition with opened valves.96 
The Iraqi environmental destruction was heavily criticized by Coalition 
leaders. Thus, on 25 January, as the extent of the Iraqi oil spill into the Gulfwas 
attracting notice, U.S. officials said that the world had never previously had to deal 
with a deliberate and malicious spill. President Bush said: 
Saddam Hussein continues to amaze the world. First, he uses these Scud missiles 
that have no military value whatsoever. Then, he uses the lives of prisoners of war, 
parading them and threatening to use them as shields; obviously, they have been 
brutalized. And now he resorts to enormous environmental damage in terms of 
letting loose a lot of oil- no military advantage to him whatsoever in this. It is not 
going to help him at all ... I mean, he clearly is outraging the world.97 
Richard Cheney accused Saddam Hussein of environmental terrorism, adding: 
"It is one more piece of evidence, if any more were needed, about the nature of the 
man himself. He is best described as an international outlaw.,,98 On 28 January, 
Michael Heseltine, the British Secretary of State for the Environment, said in a 
long statement in the House of Commons: "Words are inadequate to condemn the 
callousness and irresponsibility of the action of Saddam Hussein in deliberately 
unleashing this environmental catastrophe.,,99 On 22 February he said in a written 
answer: "Iraqi action has already led to damage to the environment as indicated 
by the deliberate release of oil into the Gulf. The Government together with the 
countries ofthe OECD has condemned this action as a violation of international 
law and a crime against the environment." On the environmental impact of 
operations by the forces seeking to implement U.N. resolutions, he said: 
"Environmental factors are taken into account by the Coalition forces as far as 
possible in the planning and conduct of military operations as part of the policy 
of ensuring that collateral damage from those operations is minimised."IOO 
On 22 February, as the Iraqis began destroying the Kuwaiti oil installations, 
and on the eve of the Coalition land offensive, President Bush said: "He is 
wantonly setting fire to and destroying the oil wells, the oil tanks, the export 
terminals, and other installations of that small country."IOI On the same day, in 
Riyadh, Brigadier General Richard Neal, Central Command's Deputy Director of 
Operations, commented: "It looks like he's carrying out what he said on several 
occasions. We've had a difficult time trying to figure out the motivation for a lot 
of his actions."I02 
The destruction of the oil installations in Kuwait proved to be on the massive 
scale which some had forecast, the rate of burn-off was actually higher than many 
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had anticipated, and the consequences were serious. The flood of oil from the wells 
formed lakes and reportedly affected aquifers. The fires involved huge waste of a 
valuable natural resource. They spewed many gases, including the 'greenhouse' 
gas carbon dioxide (perhaps 3 per cent of the world's total annual fossil fuel 
emissions), into the atmosphere. Heavy metal-laden soot particles and aromatic 
hydrocarbons contributed to the atmospheric pollution. In Kuwait, in the months 
after the war, the heavy atmospheric pollution caused an increase in respiratory 
illnesses, a lowering of regional temperatures, and much damage to the land.103 
The smoke was widely reported as having adverse effects in neighboring countries, 
including Iran and Saudi Arabia, and in the waters of the Gulf. There were reports 
of black rain in Turkey, Iran and the Himalayas. However, the harmful effects of 
the oil fires were mainly regional, and were nothing like the global disaster which 
some had forecast. Soot from the fires does not appear to have risen high enough 
to cause the global environmental effects which some had feared. There was no 
demonstrable effect on the climate outside the Persian Gulf region, and no 
demonstrable influence on the Indian monsoon.104 
The Iraqi actions-the discharge of oil into the Gulf, and the burning of the 
Kuwaiti oilfields-were plainly contrary to the laws of war. There has been general 
agreement that they violated Article 23 (g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. It is 
also widely accepted that they violated Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV; and 
also Article 53, which is in the section on occupied territories. Whether the Iraqi 
actions would have constituted violations of two conventions which mention the 
environment-the 1977 ENMOD Convention, and Additional Protocol 
I-neither of which was in force in the 1991 Gulf War, is a more contentious 
matter. 
As regards ENMOD, a key question would be: was Iraq, to use the language of 
Article II, "changing - through the deliberate manipUlation of natural processes 
- the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space"? It might well be 
asserted that this was, rather, a case of the deliberate abuse of man-made 
installations and artificial processes: of damage to the environment, but not 
necessarily damage by the forces of the environment. The terms of EN MOD, as 
well as the fact that it was not in force in this war, suggest that it had little or no 
relevance to the Iraqi actions. !OS 
As regards Anicles 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I, there is perhaps more 
room for the view that Iraqi actions would have violated these environmental 
provisions. In its July 1991 Interim Report to Congress, the Pentagon stated that 
Iraq had committed extensive and premeditated war crimes, which included 
"unnecessary destrUction, as evidenced by the release of oil into the Persian Gulf 
and the sabotage of hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells." It stated that these actions 
"could implicate a number of customary and conventional international law 
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principles," including from the 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV, and further mentioned in its list Articles 3S and SS of Additional 
Protocol 1.106 However, the Pentagon's April 1992 Final Report, while continuing 
to assert the illegality ofIraqi actions, was much more dismissive of the Protocol's 
relevance, especially in the following: 
Even had Protocol I been in force, there were questions as to whether the Iraqi actions 
would have violated its environmental provisions. During that treaty's negotiation, 
there was general agreement that one of its criteria for determining whether a 
violation had taken place ("long-term") was measured in decades. It is not clear the 
damage Iraq caused, while severe in the layman's sense of the term, would meet the 
technical-legal use of that term in Protocol 1. The prohibitions on damage to the 
environment contained in Protocol I were not intended to prohibit battlefield 
damage caused by conventional operations and, in alllikelihood, would not apply to 
Iraq's actions in the Persian GulfWar.107 
This passage is likely to provoke criticism, especially for its characterization 
ofIraqi actions and their consequences. Yet the fact that there is scope for debate 
about the relevance of the environmental provisions of Additional Protocol I (and 
also of EN MOD) confirms the importance of earlier provisions, including from 
the 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Geneva Convention IV: these were a key 
basis for judging Iraqi actions. 
C. Coalition Military Actions 
Many Coalition actions in the crisis had environmental consequences, even if 
they were on a lesser scale than those caused by their adversaries. Further, some 
actions which they did not take could have affected the environment. In the 
months before the war, when U.N. Security Council sanctions were imposed on 
Iraq, there were some proposals that Iraq might be defeated by stopping the flow 
of the Tigris and Euphrates (both of which originate in Turkey): these were not 
implemented, for reasons that can be guessed but are not defmitely known. !OS 
Of all the actions which were taken by the Coalition, that which has attracted 
most attention as regards environmental consequences is the bombing of Iraq. 
Many objects which were attacked, such as oil storage sites, power stations, and 
warehouses, provided for the needs of both the armed forces and the civilian 
population. It must be doubtful whether it is possible to embark on a policy of 
damaging the military function of such targets without at the same time doing 
harm to the civilian population and/or the environment; and so it proved in this 
case. In March 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the war, a controversial report 
submitted to the United Nations by Martti Ahtisaari, the Finnish head of a special 
investigative commission, deplored the devastation of Iraq. It noted the 
destruction of non-military objectives in Iraq-for example, a seed warehouse, and 
a plant producing veterinary vaccines-and it said that "all electrically operated 
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installations have ceased to function," causing shortages and contamination of the 
water supply. 109 The damage to facilities serving Iraqi civilian life was serious, and 
was notably criticized in a report by Middle East Watch.110 Some other reports in 
the aftermath of the war were less negative.Ill In the present state of the law, a 
verdict that the bombing policy in general was illegal would be hard to sustain. 
However, Oscar Schachter's judgement is worth noting: "The enormous 
devastation that did result from the massive aerial attacks suggests that the legal 
standards of distinction and proportionality did not have much practical 
effect.,,1l2 
The coalition attacks on nuclear facilities in Iraq raised worries that there might 
be substantial release of radioactive materials, causing local environmental 
damage. Because, as is now known, Iraq had removed its nuclear materials and 
buried them off-site, such release appears to have been minor. The question 
remains, whether attacks on facilities containing nuclear materials would be 
contrary to the laws of war. There appears to be no absolute answer. The problem 
comes closest to being addressed in Additional Protocol I, Article 56, on 'Works 
and installations containing dangerous forces'. However, this is of limited 
relevance because, as noted above, (a) it is not accepted as part of customary law; 
and (b) it deals with 'nuclear electrical generating stations', but does not appear to 
address the types of nuclear installation actually attacked in Iraq. Even if the 
targets had been nuclear electrical generating stations, attack is only prohibited 
(and then incompletely) "if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
and consequent severe losses among the civilian popUlation." If attack does take 
place, "all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of the dangerous 
forces." These formulae leave much to the judgement and skill of the attackers; 
and confirm that there are, inevitably, many loose ends left by the negotiators who 
concluded Additional Protocol I. Clearly, attacks on nuclear installations risk very 
serious consequences, and require very special reasons and precautions; but in the 
present state of the law it cannot be said that they are always prohibited.u3 
A strong defense of the Coalition bombing policy generally can be made along 
the lines that it was aimed at targets which had some military relevance, was 
conducted with unusual precision, and any damage which was outside the proper 
military purposes of the war was accidental or collateral in character. These points 
were emphasized by Tom King MP, Secretary of State for Defence, in evidence to 
the Defence Committee of the House of Commons on 6 March 1991. He stated 
categorically that water pumping plants in Baghdad had not been a target, though 
their operations had inevitably suffered from the attacks on electrical 
power-generating stations; and he said that nuclear reactors were only attacked 
"after the most detailed planning to minimise the risk of any radiation spreading 
outside the site.,,1l4 The account of the war in the British Defense white paper 
makes the same point: 
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There was evidence too that Iraq had been seeking to develop nuclear and biological 
weapons. The allies therefore placed great importance on deterring Iraq from using 
any such weapons. Alliance leaders made it clear they would take the gravest view of 
any Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction. Production and development facilities 
were attacked with precision-guided munitions using tactics designed to minimise 
any risk of contamination outside the sites. llS 
Similarly, the Pentagon's reports to the U.S. Congress in July 1991 and April 
1992 say of the bombing campaign that aircraft and munitions were carefully 
selected to achieve "the least risk to civilian objects and the civilian population.,,116 
Taking the Coalition bombing campaign overall, and making full allowance for 
the inadequate state of current information about its effects, it does appear that 
such Coalition actions as damaged the environment were less wanton and 
gratuitous than the Iraqi oil crimes in Kuwait, and that some, but only some, 
significant efforts were made to avoid or reduce certain kinds of environmental 
damage. However, the allied actions serve as an uncomfortable reminder that 
prohibiting or reducing the environmental damage of war is not a simple task. 
D. Remnants of War 
The dangerous effects of remnants of war have long been a cause of concern, 
including to the United NationsY7 Such acts as the laying of mines without 
keeping careful plans violate basic principles of the laws of war on several grounds. 
They pose a serious risk to innocent human life, even after the end of a war, and 
they may degrade the environment in a lasting way. Moreover, attempts to make 
the land environment safe again are liable to cost a great deal of money, human 
effort, and lives. 
The 1991 Gulf War left the land littered with the remnants of war. There were 
trenches of oil on the frontier with Saudi Arabia, prepared by Iraqi forces to 
frustrate a Coalition invasion; and pools of oil near the destroyed oil installations. 
Iraqi forces reportedly laid more than 500,000 mines in Kuwait, and abandoned 
quantities of ammunition. As to the Coalition, as many as one third of its bombs 
and projectiles reportedly failed to detonate, the soft sand and the use of stockpiled 
or experimental weapons increasing the failure rate; and many U.S. anti-personnel 
submunitions, dropped into the battle area, remained a lethal hazard 
afterwards.llS Substantial quantities of depleted uranium, which is toxic and 
mildly radioactive, remained littered around the battlefield; it had been used for 
armor piercing both in tank ammunition, and in bullets fired from aircraft. Its use 
caused concern both because of possible health consequences for soldiers exposed 
to it during the war, and because the remnants may constitute a health hazard in 
post-war Kuwait and Iraq.1l9 
Some less-publicized aspects of environmental damage were pqtentially serious. 
According to some accounts, the movements of armored vehicles over the desert 
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landscape of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq in the months of crisis and war left 
the desert surface looser than before, and may have increased the likelihood of 
severe sandstorms. 
E. 'GuljWar Syndrome' 
After the war, a number of people who had served in the war zone developed a 
variety of symptoms, some of which came to be grouped under one heading as 
"Gulf War syndrome." Various possible causes were mentioned, including some 
of the antidotes which had been administered (in injection and pill form) to reduce 
vulnerability to possible Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons. 
Environmental factors were also mentioned as one possible type of explanation of 
at least some of the symptoms; it was suggested that the servicemen concerned 
had been exposed to dangerous chemicals, including possibly remnants of certain 
Iraqi chemical weapons deployed in Kuwait. Law suits and detailed investigations 
were undertaken in both the U.S. and U.K. On 27 July 1995 the Royal College of 
Physicians gave its official backing for further investigation into "Gulf War 
syndrome," the alleged war-related illness affecting more than 600 U.K. veterans 
(out of a total U.K. contingent of about 51,000) who served in the 1991 conflict. 
However, at the same time, the College concluded, on the basis of a clinical 
assessment of the medical checks on 200 veterans completed by the Ministry of 
Defence, that there was no single cause for the variety of illnesses suffered by the 
servicemen and women who had been examined.120 
x. ACTION TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT DURING AND AFTER 
THE WAR 
During and after the war, the tackling of major environmental hazards in the 
whole area of the conflict involved difficult problems of diagnosis, prescription, 
organization and international cooperation. 
There was much action to limit the effects of the oil spills in the Gulf. During 
the war, the U.S. Government (apart from its successful bombing on 26 January) 
took some effective action on an inter-agency basis. A huge containment and 
recovery effort was made by Saudi Arabia's Meteorology and Environmental 
Protection Administration and by the International Maritime Organization. 
Under auspices of the U.N. Environment Programme and the Regional 
Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME), a special 
oil clean-up ship, the Ali-Wasit, recovered 500,000 barrels of oil from the Gulf. 
Altogether, some two million barrels of oil were recovered.121 A serious threat to 
the world's largest desalination plant, at al Jubayl in Saudi Arabia, was effectively 
countered by booms, nets and skimmers. Efforts were concentrated on protecting 
industrial and desalination plants, rather than on environmentally sensitive areas. 
There was much dispute over appropriate methods of tackling this and similar 
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disasters.122 Although a thick tarry layer remained in the sands of the Saudi coast, 
the waters and wildlife of the Gulf made an impressive recovery, confirming to 
some observers the remarkable capacity of nature to survive disasters.123 
As to the oil fires in Kuwait, there was debate about the adequacy of preparations 
during the war, by either the U.S. Government or the Kuwaiti Government in 
exile, to prepare for putting them out; and afterwards, the U.S. administration 
seemed to down-play the impact of the fires - perhaps because it wanted neither 
to seem obsessed about oil, nor to raise any doubts about the wisdom of a war which 
left such a pall.l24 After a slow start, work on controlling the oil fires gathered 
pace: the last fire was extinguished on 6 November 1991. There were inevitably 
missed opportunities, and many lessons to be learned from this episode so far as 
future oil fire disasters are concerned.125 In 1992 there was criticism of the Kuwaiti 
authorities for further damaging the wells by rushing to bring them back on stream 
before they had time to recover.126 
Numerous other aspects of the clean-up operations posed problems. In Kuwait, 
huge quantities of oil remained on the surface even after the fires were put out; 
some of this was effectively recovered. The most serious problem was unexploded 
weapons, including mines. In less than a year after the war, explosive ordnance 
reportedly killed or wounded some 1,250 civilians, and claimed fifty lives of 
demolition specialists.126 
International bodies played a significant part in the clean-up efforts after the 
war. Under the auspices of the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP), a Plan of 
Action was drawn up to address the consequences of the conflict on the marine, 
coastal, atmospheric and terrestrial environments, and also the subject of 
hazardous waste in the region. This was adopted for implementation by the 
Council ofROPME on 16-17 October 1991. UNEP continued to play an important 
part in coordinating the efforts of the U.N. and other international organizations 
to assess the effects of the conflict, and to mobilize funds for assessment and 
rehabilitation programes.128 
The aftermath of the war confirmed the need for governments and armed forces 
to take much more seriously the whole problem of limiting the effect of war on 
the environment, and putting right the damage that is done. Some problems of a 
very widespread character, not exclusively linked to the 1991 Gulf War, were 
addressed. For example, on 21 May 1993, the UNEP Governing Council approved 
a decision asking governments to establish a national environmental policy for the 
military sector, and requesting the Executive Director to report on the application 
of environmental norms for the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes by 
military establishments.129 
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XI. POST-WAR LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Question of Iraqi Responsibility 
After the war, the U.N. Security Council held Iraq responsible for the damage 
caused by the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 130 Resolution 686 of 2 March 
1991 demanded that Iraq "accept in principle its liability under international law 
for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and 
their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation 
of Kuwait by Iraq." It also required Iraq to "provide all information and assistance 
in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical 
and biological weapons and material in Kuwait ..... " 
Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 - the longest ever passed by the Security 
Council- contained many provisions relevant to the environment. It reaffirmed 
that Iraq "is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign 
governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait." Further, stringent measures of disarmament -
especially in the chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear fields - were imposed 
on Iraq by that and subsequent resolutions. Iraq was invited to affirm 
unconditionally its existing obligatiom: under certain treaties, and to ratify the 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention.131 
Despite the above-mentioned resolutions, after the cease-fire almost nothing 
was heard from the Coalition governments on the subject of the major war crimes, 
and the personal responsibility of Saddam Hussein and colleagues for them. The 
Security Council resolutions were silent on the subject. Some Iraqis who had been 
caught in Kuwait at the end of the war were tried there in summer 1991 for various 
offenses in connection with the occupation, but the larger issue of the 
responsibility of the top Iraqi leadership was not addressed by the U.N. The 
question of Iraqi war crimes obviously embraces the whole range of offenses by 
Iraq, and not just those relating to the environment. However, the fact that major 
and wanton environmental damage was apparently going unpunished (except in 
the broader context of the attempt to secure reparations and compensation from 
Iraq via the U.N. Compensation Commission set up in 1991) was serious: an 
opportunity to spell out, in a clear and forceful manner, the criminal nature of 
certain Iraqi actions, including wanton damage to the environment, was missed. 
The Security Council's failure since the war to address the question of war crimes 
is all the more striking when the explicit reference to such crimes in Resolution 
674 of 29 October 1990 is recalled.The reasons why the war crimes issue was not 
pursued are serious and need to be understood. Six stand out. First, there was wide 
agreement in the months before January 1991 that if there was to be a war for the 
liberation of Kuwait, it had to be a limited war for clearly limited and defined 
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objectives; that being so, the capturing 'of Saddam Hussein and colleagues, 
however criminal their acts, would not have easily fitted into the Coalition scheme 
of things. Second, the Iraqi leaders would have been difficult to arrest even if the 
Coalition action had been more offensive. Third, there were obvious difficulties 
in demanding Saddam Hussein's arrest as a war criminal at the same time as 
negotiating cease-fire terms with him; and in early March the cease-fire seemed 
more important. Fourth, there was nervousness in Washington, London, and 
other Coalition capitals about pressing any proposal for trials if opinion in 
countries in the region did not want to go down this road. Fifth, there was a 
question as to whether Iraqi actions before and after this war, including against 
Kurds and Marsh Arabs, should also be included. And sixth, in many Coalition 
capitals there was the hope, publicly expressed from the beginning of the war, that 
some kind of coup d'etat or revolution within Iraq would solve the problem.132 
However, as a minimum, it would have been possible for an authoritative 
statement to be made promptly, to the effect that major war crimes had occurred, 
involving inter alia grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; that there was 
personal responsibility for these crimes; and that under the Geneva Conventions 
any State was entitled to prosecute. Such a statement would at least have had the 
effect of making it clear, at a time when interest was high, that Saddam Hussein 
and colleagues would be exposed to risk of prosecution if they set foot in other 
countries. It would also have given a little more consistency to the otherwise 
confusing positions taken by the leading Coalition powers and the Security 
Council. 
The United States did eventually, in a war crimes report prepared under the 
auspices of the Secretary of the Army in January 1992 and issued by the U.N. in 
March 1993, put on the record a clear statement about Iraqi war crimes. This 
report, which was not widely noted at the time or subsequently, includes some 
references to various Iraqi actions which had a damaging effect on the 
environment, and treats them as violations of1907 Hague Convention IV and of 
1949 Geneva Convention IV.133 
B. Development of International Law 
The 1991 Gulf War, like many previous wars, led to much discussion as to 
whether, and if so how, international law might be developed to address more 
effectively the problems it had exposed. In particular, there was extensive 
consideration of the protection of the environment in warfare. 
It was widely recognized that one war is too narrow a frame of reference for such 
discussions. After all, environmental damage in war can take many forms; and 
non-international armed conflicts must be taken into account. But the war did 
point to many general problems which needed to be addressed-for example, 
securing recognition and immunity (whether on the model of the ICRC, or civil 
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defense or other relief workers) for individuals and organizations concerned with 
monitoring and controlling environmental damage in peacetime or wartime-
from measuring air pollution to rescuing injured wildlife. 
Some of the immediate post-war discussion was centered on proposals for a new 
international treaty. The idea of a possible 'fifth Geneva Convention', to address 
directly the issue of environmental damage in war, was tentatively aired.134 
However, the weight of opinion among governments and international lawyers 
favored proceeding by more modest steps, including fuller ratification, exposition, 
implementation, and development of existing law. Resolutions in various bodies 
- being a way of enunciating general principles, and relating them to particular 
problems as they arise - were advocated as one means of assisting such 
purposes.13S 
After the war, some saw Additional Protocol I as centrally important so far as 
the protection of the environment in war is concerned. For example, a consultation 
in Munich in December 1991, mainly of environmental lawyers, began its final 
statement with the following recommendations: 
1. The Experts Group strongly urged universal acceptance of existing international 
legal instruments, in particular of the 1977 Protocol ... 
2. The Group observed that the current recognition that the environment itself is an 
object of legal protection in times of armed conflict implies that traditional 
perceptions of proportionality and military necessity have become obsolete.136 
Although the Munich meeting also highlighted the importance of customary 
norms prohibiting devastation, it is doubtful whether it was wise to put such great 
emphasis on Additional Protocol I, and to go so far in rejecting certain other 
aspects of the laws of war, including traditional perceptions ofproportionality. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross was, not surprisingly, a main 
vehicle for taking forward the question of the effect of war on the environment. 
The ICRC gave consideration to this in the run-up to the XXVIth International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which had been due to be held in 
Budapest in November 1991, but had to be postponed.137 A draft resolution for 
the conference had, like earlier ICRC pronouncements, put great and perhaps 
disproportionate emphasis on Additional Protocol I. The resolution stated, inter 
alia, that the conference: 
[CJalls on States which have not yet acceded to or ratified the international treaties 
containing provisions for the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict 
rapidly to consider becoming party thereto, [and] 
[EJncourages the ICRC, in co-operation with the organizations concerned, to examine 
the contents, limitations and possible shortcomings of the international rules for the 
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protection of the environment in time of armed conflict and to make proposals in 
that respect .. Ps 
The U.N. General Assembly has supported such an approach. In December 
1991, it suggested further consideration of the matter in conjunction with the 
ICRC.139 The ICRC then convened a meeting of experts on the protection of the 
environment in time of armed conflict, held in Geneva in April 1992, and on 30 
June submitted an 18-page report to the U.N. General Assembly. This emphasized 
the need to observe existing law in this area, and the ICRC's continued willingness 
to address the issue. It also identified a number of issues for further research and 
action. l40 This was one input into ongoing discussions in the Sixth Committee, 
resulting in a November 1992 resolution which was the General Assembly's most 
important pronouncement on the subject. It recognized the importance of the 1907 
Hague Convention IV and the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, as well as later 
agreements. It stated unambiguously in its preamble "that destruction of the 
environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is 
clearly contrary to existing international law," and then in its operational part said 
that the General Assembly; 
1. Urges States to take all measures to ensure compliance with the existing 
international law applicable to the protection of the environment in times of armed 
conflict; 
2. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the 
relevant international conventions; 
3. Urges States to take steps to incorporate the provisions of international law 
applicable to the protection of the environment into their military manuals and to 
ensure that they are effectively disseminated.141 
Meanwhile, Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration of June 1992 had offered the 
anodyne formula, which was evidence ofinternational concern but did not advance 
things significantly; 
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.142 
After 1992, the General Assembly continued to be seised of the protection of 
the environment in times of armed conflict, but simply as one part of the agenda 
item "U.N. Decade ofInternational Law." It remained content to express support 
for work done under ICRC auspices. The ICRC convened two further meetings of 
experts, in January and June 1993, which led to a new report defining the content 
of existing law, identifying problems of implementation, suggesting what action 
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needed to be taken, and drawing up model guidelines for military manuals. 143 The 
General Assembly particularly supported the ICRC on this last point.l44 
XII. GENERAL ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS 
One war is too narrow a frame of reference for making hard and fast observations 
on the perennial and multi-faceted subject of the impact of war on the 
environment. Environmentalists and lawyers may, like generals, be open to the 
accusation of always fighting the last war. Vietnam produced very different 
environmental problems, and so will future wars. Both in peace and war, 
environmental damage can take many forms; can be very hard to forecast 
beforehand and to assess afterwards; can be prevented or reduced by a bewildering 
variety of different means; and is sometimes hard to rectify once it has happened. 
However, the environmental issues raised by the 1991 Gulf War were of 
sufficient seriousness that they must form part of any attempt at overall assessment 
of how damage to the environment in war can be effectively limited. This 
statement by a Kuwaiti woman in late 1991 commands respect: "We won the 
ground war, we won the air war, but we lost the environmental war.,,145 The 1991 
Gulf War saw what were arguably the worst acts of deliberate environmental 
destruction of any war in thi~ century. It also showed, in a more general way, how 
modern war involves a wide range of hazards to the human and natural 
environment; and how an increased level of concern with environmental issues, 
especially in Western societies, can influence public views about the legitimacy of 
certain military activities. The war, in short, saw new manifestations of problems 
relating to the environment which are likely to get more serious as societies 
develop. 
A. Illegality of Certain Acts of Environmental Destruction 
In warfare, actions damaging to the environment, when associated with wanton 
destruction not justified by military necessity, are contrary to well established and 
universally binding parts of the laws of war. Prohibitions of wanton destruction 
in major treaties, including the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, have a strong bearing on the environment, as do the underlying 
principles of the laws of war, evidence from past practice and trials, and certain 
customary rules. The environmental provisions in the ENMOD Convention, and 
in Additional Protocol I, should be seen as essentially supplementing these 
fundamental sources - and in the case of EN MOD as covering such special cases 
as the use of rain-making or defoliation techniques - rather than as constituting 
the core of the laws of war rules regarding the environment. As for the large body 
of general (peacetime) international law relating to aspects of the environment, 
decision-makers and commanders may be expected to pay due regard to its 
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provisions; and there is a need for a factual and pragmatic examination of how this 
body oflaw has in fact operated during armed conflicts. 
B. Certain Iraqi Actions as Violations of the Laws of War 
There is no serious disagreement with the proposition that, during the 1990-91 
Gulf Conflict, the laws of war were violated by much Iraqi action of an 
environmentally damaging kind: the indiscriminate laying of mines, the creation 
of huge oil slicks, and the wanton destruction of oil facilities in the occupied 
territory of Kuwait. The Iraqi Government undoubtedly deserves-the lion's share 
of blame for the environmental destruction, as it does for so much else in this war. 
Even if the point had not been stated beforehand as authoritatively, clearly and 
frequently as might have been wished, the Iraqi leaders should not have been in 
doubt that the environmental destruction in which they engaged was a violation 
of international law. 
C. Did New Weapons Systems Cause Environmental Problems? 
Some modern weaponry used in the war appears to have caused problems of an 
environmental character, mainly after the end of the war, to people in the former 
war zones. Unexploded cluster-bombs and depleted uranium armor-penetrators, 
are cases in point. Mines constituted a more old fashioned but perhaps more deadly 
threat. The Coalition bombing campaign involved use of some new weaponry to 
attack targets in Iraq, but in many cases this assisted accuracy and reduced 
collateral damage. 
The most environmentally questionable acts in this war were not caused by new 
or especially deadly weaponry, but by selecting as targets sensitive installations-
including oil installations and nuclear reactors. On the Iraqi side, the attacks on 
oil installations were not so much acts of combat as wanton destruction of property 
in occupied territory. 
D. Why did Iraq Engage in Widespread Destruction? 
Various reasons, both military and psycho-pathological, have been advanced to 
explain Iraq's wanton acts of destruction. Some elementary considerations deserve 
mention. First and foremost, Iraq simply wanted to destroy Kuwait if it could not 
control it. Retreating aggressors do often engage in wholesale destruction of the 
territory they had occupied-a fact which underscores the importance the 
international community attaches to rules against wanton (including 
environmentally damaging) destruction. The less powerful side in a war is often 
the side most tempted to resort to desperate expedients, even if those expedients 
involve an element of self-destruction, and offer no serious hope of turning defeat 
into victory. The desire to deny a victor the fruits of war, common enough anyway, 
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would have been reinforced if the Iraqi leadership believed its own propaganda to 
the effect that it was for the sake of oil that the U.S. went to Kuwait's rescue. 
On a more fundamental level, Iraq's sense of alienation from international 
society-the product of a particular and in many ways debatable interpretation of 
its own history-made matters worse. Iraq (which was far from alone in this) had 
not incorporated into its martial ethos or military training the whole range oflaws 
of war provisions to which it was bound by treaty. Further, Saddam Hussein may 
well have learned a terrible lesson from the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. From the 
international community's failure to react to the original attack on Iran in 1980, 
and from its failure to do anything much about Iraq's use of gas, he doubtless 
concluded that he could ignore international law and institutions with impunity. 
In addition, the occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent war took place against 
the background of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan 
Heights-an occupation which was 23 years old in the summer of 1990. Rightly 
or wrongly, many Arabs saw the Israeli occupation as proof of the inefficacy or 
bias of international legal institutions. This may have contributed to Iraq's and 
the PLO's reckless disregard of international legal restraints in the crisis over 
Kuwait. 
E. Did the Coalition Do Enough to Prevent Environmental Destruction? 
A key question raised by the environmental destruction in this war (as also by 
the Iraqi use of hostages and treatment of prisoners of war) is how to secure 
understanding and implementation of existing law. In particular, how is the 
international community to respond before, during and after a war, when one 
belligerent apparently rejects basic provisions of the laws of war and/or appears 
unconcerned about environmental issues? 
The Coalition powers did take laws of war issues, and environmental 
considerations, into account in many aspects of their actions. However, many 
problems remained. Attacks on such military targets as electric generating stations 
in Iraq had serious effects on water and sewage systems, leading to disease and loss 
of life. In addition, significant possibilities of emphasizing the laws of war as a 
means of inducing restraint between the belligerents may have been missed, 
especially in the field of environmental destruction. 
At the start of Operation Desert Storm in January, should there have been a 
public statement from the Coalition about what international agreements, 
provisions and principles relating to the laws of war were beyond question in force? 
While there would have been hazards in such a course, Iraq did need reminding 
of its obligations; and different participants in the Coalition were in some cases 
bound by different treaties, so there were possibilities of inter-allied confusion. 
In particular, it is remarkable that the Coalition powers apparently did not take 
further the warning against destruction of Kuwait's oilfields and installations that 
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had been contained in President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein-the letter 
rejected at Geneva on 9 January 1991. It may be that on this, as on other matters 
relating to the 1991 Gulf War, much important activity was not in the public 
domain and will only emerge slowly and belatedly. The Pentagon's Interim Report 
said: 
Means to deter or restrict Saddam's capability to inflict environmental damage were 
limited. Assessments weighed whether aerial bombardment by the Coalition of key 
Kuwaiti facilities prior to Iraqi sabotage might cause more damage than it,&revented 
or provoke the Iraqis to embark on an even more widespread campaign.i 
This leaves it unclear how much consideration, if any, was given to the possibility 
of a serious effort-by major statements, by broadcast, and by leaflet-to spell out in 
advance to Iraqi officers at all levels the criminality of setting fire to oil wells out of 
vengeance, the personal responsibility they would bear if they participated in such 
acts, and the possibility of a tough response by the Coalition if Iraq persisted in such 
destruction. Of the millions ofleaflets dropped by the Coalition powers on Iraqi forces, 
none discouraged environmental destruction. 
There must be scepticism as to whether a clearer enunciation of the law, coupled 
with statements on the consequences of violating it, would have stopped Saddam 
Hussein or those under him in their environmentally destructive tracks. After all, 
the rules on the treatment of inhabitants of occupied Kuwait, and on treatment of 
prisoners of war, were perfectly clear, but this did not stop Iraq from cruelly 
mistreating such people and ignoring some of the most basic provisions of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions. There can be no certainty that a stronger effort to 
impress on the Iraqi Government or Iraqi officers the illegality of environmental 
destruction would have worked; but it might have been worth trying. 
The problem ofinducing Iraqi restraint in the matter of environmental damage 
was in some ways similar to the problem of preventing Iraqi use of gas and chemical 
warfare. Both issues involved international legal standards. Both also raised the 
questions of how to actively deter criminal Iraqi action; and of how to ensure that 
Iraqi commanders at all levels were fully aware of their personal responsibility, 
and liability, for any violations. 
The Coalition powers did make a serious and successful effort to dissuade Iraq 
from resorting to gas and chemical weapons. On the basis of the succinct 
prohibition of gas and chemical warfare in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, they 
confirmed the illegality of resorting to such means, and adopted a strong deterrent 
posture, repeatedly threatening severe retaliation if such weapons were used. They 
took a similar line regarding nuclear and biological weapons, with special 
emphasis on destruction ofIraq's capacity. 147 In respect of the environment, their 
efforts do not appear to have been so consistent or successful. During this crisis, 
at least until the point where Saddam Hussein's environmental threats began to 
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be carried out on a large scale, there were few authoritative statements on the 
illegality of acts of wanton destruction causing massive environmental damage. 
There are several possible explanations for what appears to have been a failure 
of the Coalition governments to make serious efforts to dissuade Iraq from wanton 
environmental destruction. In some countries, including the U.S. and U.K., it is 
possible that there may have been some residual elements of doubt as to whether 
such destruction was unambiguously against the written laws of war as they were 
in force in the Gulf, especially bearing in mind that none of the three laws of war 
treaties mentioning the environment by name was technically in force in this war. 
At all events, there was no short and undisputed text to be cited. It probably did 
not help that the Coalition leader, the U.S., had in the preceding years expressed 
criticisms of Additional Protocol I in general, and also, occasionally, of its 
environmental rules in particular. 
The second, and more likely, explanation has to do with the urgency of other 
claims on the attention of the Coalition governments and armed forces, especially 
those of the U.S. They had more immediate worries: the ever-present possibility 
of gas, biological or even nuclear weapons being used against Coalition troops; the 
nightly Scud missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia-in the former case posing 
the risk of the war getting out of hand; mistreatment of their prisoners in Iraqi 
hands; and the threat of terrorist attacks beyond the region. It is not surprising, 
even if it is regrettable, that environmental hazards, whose effects would be slower 
to develop, and which did not pose a threat to the Coalition's prosecution of the 
war, did not feature so prominently in governmental decision-making on the 
Coalition side. Allied governments might have been especially reluctant to get into 
a confused and dangerous process of threats and reprisals in respect of 
environmental damage, wanting perhaps to reserve their retaliatory threats as 
counters to more immediately worrying Iraqi actions. This raises the disturbing 
possibility that in war it is always likely to be so: there will always be more pressing 
issues than long-term protection of the environment. Often in life the important 
yields to the urgent. 
A third possible level of explanation is that of the military mind-set. Military 
staffs may simply have lacked the training and mental framework to consider 
environmental damage as a major issue to be addressed in the planning and 
conduct of war. Overall, the performance of the Coalition side in the 1991 Gulf 
War and other recent wars suggests that any such military mind-set is slowly 
changing in favor of a greater awareness of the salience of environmental issues. 
Further, it so happened in this war that issues which were environmental, 
idealistic and green (avoid fouling up the air and the waters) were also materialist 
and capitalist (avoid destruction of the oilfields and installations); the Coalition 
governments, anxious to demonstrate to their domestic and international critics 
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that this was not just a war for oil, may have been inhibited about placing heavy 
emphasis on the protection of the oilfields and installations. 
F. Did Environmentalists Weaken Their Own Case? 
Environmental organizations and individuals played a prominent part in 
debates before, during, and after the war. They did much to focus attention of the 
adverse environmental effects of the war, and to stimulate clean-up and preventive 
measures of various kinds. However, some of the approaches taken by some 
environmentalists may have weakened their own case, and illustrated certain 
hazards of single-issue campaigning. 
First, in the weeks and months before the outbreak of war in January 1991, 
environmental hazards had been raised as a reason for not resorting to war at all, 
rather than as a reason for trying to get some restraint in the conduct of the war. 
Some environmentalists appeared reluctant to concede the possibility that 
ecological factors might have to be balanced against other powerful considerations, 
such as prevention of aggression, or maintenance of the credibility of international 
institutions. Almost all of those expressing concern about environmental hazards, 
being reluctant to contemplate war at all, had failed to make specific proposals of 
a kind which might have helped to limit any war which did occur. 
Second, the tendency of some environmentalists in the weeks before the 
outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War to forecast utter environmental catastrophe on a 
global scale may have reduced their credibility and effectiveness. Prophecies of 
doom should be used sparingly if they are to have any credibility; In any event, 
although the oil spills and destruction of oil wells were at least of the magnitude 
forecast, the actual damage was local, mainly in Kuwait but also in Iraq and in 
other States which border on the Gul£ The Iraqi actions in respect of oil were 
criminal more because they were a stupid waste of good resources and caused 
extensive local damage than because they threatened the planet with catastrophic 
climate change. Further, a main environmental threat, the indiscriminate laying 
of mines, was also limited in scope rather than apocalyptic. 
Third, to the extent that environmentalists and others put emphasis on 
Additional Protocol I, they may have had the effect of underplaying the 
significance of those earlier rules, from 1907 and 1949, which were a sounder basis 
for asserting the illegality of the Iraqi actions. It was unfortunate that Iraqi threats 
to set fire to oilwells and release oil on land and at sea were discussed in terms of 
a threat to the environment, rather than in the legally safer terms of wanton 
destruction. 
G. Failure on Laws o/War Issues at the United Nations 
The U. N. did litde, either before and during the war, to spell out in a clear and 
comprehensive way the laws of war rules which applied to the Iraqi occupation of 
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Kuwait, and which would apply to any war between the Coalition and Iraq. This 
was true of the Security Council, of the Secretariat, and also of the General 
Assembly, whose work on laws of war matters during this particular crisis (in 
marked contrast to some other conflicts) was practically non-existent. 
There was no formal obligation on any part of the U.N. system, or indeed on 
the Coalition, to spell out publicly how laws of war would apply in this occupation 
and conflict. The difficulties of doing so in any detail are obvious. Others, 
including the ICRC, could and did perform this task. Yet there is bound to be an 
argument that this omission on the part of the U.N. was serious, especially so far 
as environmental issues were concerned. Iraq had already made environmental 
threats by September 1990: an authoritative clarification of the existing law (or at 
least its broad principles) by an international body representing governments 
would have done no harm and might even have been helpful. 
H. Additional Protocol 1 After the 1991 Gulf War 
The experience of the 1991 Gulf War raised questions about the desirability and 
adequacy of the provisions of Additional Protocol I, and about whether it should 
be ratified by those States which ~ave hitherto held back. These questions are 
numerous and complex; only a few relating to the environment are mentioned 
here. 
Of the three laws of war agreements concluded in 1977-81 which mention the 
environment, Additional Protocol I is the most important overall, and the most 
relevant to the facts of this war. However, Articles 35 and 55, with their specific 
provisions on the environment, would have been of limited relevance even if the 
treaty had been in full force. It is unnecessary to seek authority from these articles 
to assert the illegality of the particular oil-related crimes committed by Iraq in 
occupied Kuwait. The Iraqi actions were wanton destruction rather than a method 
of warfare; and they failed tests of military necessity and proportionality. 
Does Additional Protocol I, in Articles 35 and 55, establish too high a threshold 
for environmental damage? As noted earlier, the Pentagon's Final Report went so 
far as to question whether the huge environmental damage inflicted by Iraq 
actually constituted those "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment" which are prohibited in the Protocol. Certainly the requirement 
that environmental damage must be "long-term," if this continues to be measured 
in decades, will limit the utility of the Protocol's environmental provisions. 
Indeed, in many situations other provisions of the Protocol, including those 
protecting civilian objects, probably have more relevance to environmental 
protection. It is not surprising that in these circumstances there have been 
suggestions that the terms "widespread, long-term and severe" in the Protocol 
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"belong to earlier concepts of environmental protection" and need to be 
re-interpreted or revised.148 
If Additional Protocol I had been in force, would the general Coalition war 
effort have been hampered? A considered U.S. or U.K. military evaluation of this 
question would be bound to expose a wide range of problems. The war did 
undoubtedly throw into relief certain weaknesses in the Protocol. For example, 
the prohibitions on reprisals in Articles 51-56 are very sweeping, and raise the 
question whether powers should rule out in advance almost all right of reprisal 
when they are fighting an adversary with so little regard for legal.ity as Saddam 
Hussein. However, as far as environmental issues are concerned, the prohibitions 
on reprisals may not be a problem, as it is hard to know what reprisals are 
appropriate in respect of environmental damage. The provisions of Article 54, on 
protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, could 
have been cited in criticism of some Coalition bombing actions in Iraq: no bad 
thing, some would say, if it clarifies restraints on belligerents, and assists an 
informed debate about the principles of targeting. As regards Article 56, on 
protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces, the position is 
perhaps simpler: despite a few interpretations to the contrary, and for the reasons 
cited earlier, this article does not place a prohibition on attacks on the kinds of 
nuclear installations actually hit by the United States in the course of the war. 
Overall, the events of the war suggested the relevance and utility of many of the 
general principles and detailed provisions of Additional Protocol I. 
In the event that some States, including possibly the U.S., remain unwilling to 
ratify the Protocol, there will be a need to fill the gap by giving what has long been 
promised, "some alternative clear indication of which rules they consider binding 
or otherwise propose to observe.,,149 Despite the impressive work done in the crisis 
to bring the laws of war to bear on the actions of the U.S. and Coalition forces, the 
war did highlight the gap in U.S. policy towards the laws of war which was already 
evident. If the gap cannot be filled by ratification, then the "alternative clear 
indication" which is needed will have, among other things, to address matters 
relating to the environment. Revised military manuals, harmonized as far as 
possible with those of other countries, are a promising way of filling such a gap. 
J. Proposals for New Convention on War and the Environment 
The events of the 1991 Gulf War drew attention to the apparent absence of a 
simple, formally binding, set of rules about the impact of war on the environment. 
In its immediate aftermath there were, therefore, many serious arguments for some 
new attempt at codification. Yet there was always a question whether a new treaty 
was desirable and possible. The existing laws of war do say a lot, indirectly and 
directly, that bears on damage to the environment; clear and authoritative 
exposition of this was needed just as much as new legislation. 
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Negotiation for a new agreement on the environment was increasingly seen as 
hazardous. Such an attempt could run into fundamentally intractable problems 
(of which there have already been foretastes in other negotiations) about defining 
the natural environment; about defining damage to it; about working out exactly 
which environmentally damaging acts are forbidden; about distinguishing 
between intentional, collateral, and completely unexpected damage to the 
environment; about whether certain kinds of destruction, including even scorched 
earth, might be permissible in certain circumstances, including perhaps to a 
defending State within its own national territory; about establishing exactly what 
military-related activities could be permitted in any specially protected 
environmentally important areas; and about the applicability of existing 
international norms in non-international armed conflicts. The question of nuclear 
weapons would inevitably be raised, and it would probably be as hard as ever to 
bring such weapons within the framework of the laws of war. Other questions 
would be hardly less awkward. The powers which took part in the Coalition in the 
1991 Gulf War, for example, were not about to assert that absolutely all destruction 
of oil targets was impermissible. They may also have feared that other sensitive 
issues would be raised in such negotiations.1SO 
Reliance on the admittedly sparse rules and broad statements of principle 
already enshrined in many existing accords from 1907 to 1977 may indeed be more 
productive than aiming for a major new convention. Detailed rules have many 
advantages, but also weaknesses. They are vulnerable to the passage of time. 
Indeed, an examination of existing law and practice suggests that, so far as the 
environment is concerned, there is always a need for interpretation of rules and 
principles in the light of circumstances and new technical developments. In 
particular, there is often a need to balance environmental considerations against 
such factors as the importance of particular military objectives, and the need to 
save soldiers' lives. 
K. Other Courses of Action 
In any event, the ICRC, the majority of international lawyers who looked at the 
matter, and most governments, clearly favored the course that was adopted: not 
negotiating a new convention, but rather securing authoritative reports, General 
Assembly resolutions, draft military manuals and so on, drawing together existing 
principles and provisions in a simple and intelligible way. 
This process has already yielded substantial results, including the ICRC/U.N. 
report ofJuly 1993, and the General Assembly Resolutions in 1992_94.151 However, 
some legal and practical questions have scarcely begun to be addressed. First, to 
what extent are peacetime environmental agreements formally applicable, or at 
least in practice applied, during armed conflicts and military operations? Second, 
can wartime environmental clean-up efforts (which may involve a wide variety of 
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highly specialized personnel drawn from different professions) be granted 
protection comparable, say, to that accorded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to 
humanitarian relief efforts? Other issues, too, need further attention, including 
the lethal legacy of land-mines left by recent wars, and the use and disposal of 
environmentally harmful substances in weapons. 
Overall, the difficulties which arose in the Gulf conflict, especially in matters 
relating to the environment, suggest that the main problem lies in ensuring that 
the law which exists is adequately understood, widely ratified, sensibly interpreted, 
and effectively implemented. The law's purposes, principles and content need to 
be properly incorporated into the teaching of international law and relations; into 
military manuals and training; and into the minds and practices of political 
leaders, diplomats and international civil servants. 
Any wars in future decades and centuries are likely to be in areas where there 
are high chances of the environment being affected. This is mainly because 
economic development results in the availability of substances (oil, chemicals, and 
nuclear materials being the most obvious examples) which can very easily be let 
loose, whether by accident or by design, on the all-too-vulnerable land, air, and 
water on which we depend; because some parts of the natural environment are 
becoming more constricted and fragile due to peacetime trends; because much of 
the environment in which we live (especially water supplies) depend on the smooth 
running of an infrastructure easily disrupted by war; and also because some 
weapons (nuclear weapons being only the most extreme case) may themselves have 
terrible effects on the environment. For all these reasons, the environmental effects 
of war, dramatized by the 1991 Gulf War, are likely to remain a serious problem. 
Even if it can never be completely solved, the problem needs to be tackled, not 
least within a laws of war framework, and more consistently than it was in the Gulf 
conflict of 1990-91. 
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